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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Blockchain Technology on Financial Transactions 
by 
Al Tilooby 
August 2018 
Chair: Lars Mathiassen 
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business  
Blockchain technology could emerge as a disruptive innovation that streamlines financial 
transactions and attenuates their cost. Therefore, the financial industry must assess the 
opportunities and challenges presented by the technology. As a grand breakthrough, it could 
transform financial transactions and introduce new possibilities for established financial 
institutions as well as for new entrants. At the same time, incumbents and startups need to 
overcome technological, regulatory, and adoption challenges before blockchain technology can 
become a mainstream reality. Despite its potential, the literature on its impact on financial 
transactions is still fragmented, with weak empirical insights and limited theoretical 
explanations. Therefore, financial industry managers lack guidance on how to plan and prepare 
for the impact of blockchain technology on the operation of financial transactions. 
Against that backdrop, this dissertation explores the asserted and potential impacts on 
financial transactions with emphasis on asset verification, record keeping, data privacy, and 
transaction costs. The dissertation adopts a pluralist approach to examine the subject matter 
based on three approaches: analysis of the extant literature about blockchain technology 
concerning financial transactions; perception analysis based on interviews with financial 
executives, subject matter experts, and researchers; and a theoretical interpretation using 
 xii 
transaction cost theory. Therefore, the dissertation synthesizes insights from the three approaches 
to offer managers of financial institutions guidance concerning the opportunities and challenges 
of blockchain technology. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology, Financial Transactions, 
Asset Verification, Record Keeping, Data Privacy, Transaction Cost Theory
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I INTRODUCTION 
I.1 Financial Transactions 
Financial transactions are foundational to the national and global economy. The global 
financial systems transact trillions of dollars daily and serve billions of customers (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2016). Taking the USA as an example, the Automated Clearing House system 
processes more than forty trillion dollars’ worth of annual transactions—and that only represents 
about 20 percent of the electronic payments in the nation (Kiviat, 2015). With many competitors 
seeking a share of this huge market, to remain competitively efficient, financial institutions must 
frequently disrupt their operations and processes driven by new technologies such as blockchain 
(PwC, 2017). 
Workie and Jain (2017) distinguish three phases of a blockchain-based financial 
transaction: 1) the initiation phase, where a client accesses the blockchain network to buy or sell 
financial assets, 2) the verification of financial assets in the blockchain ledger by involved 
stakeholders, and 3) the recording of the information into the blockchain ledger. In alignment 
with these three phases, this dissertation focuses on four areas of financial transactions: asset 
verification, record keeping, data privacy, and transaction costs. Table 1 illustrates the mapping 
between the four areas of dissertation focus and the three phases of a blockchain-based financial 
transaction. Asset verification and record keeping map directly to the first and second phases 
respectively. However, users and financial institutions are concerned about data privacy and 
transaction costs during all phases of financial transactions. To cover the four areas of focus 
methodically, the dissertation explores the opportunities, challenges, and recommendations from 
technological, regulatory and adoption perspectives. 
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Table 1: Financial Transaction Phases and Areas of Research Focus 
At present, financial transaction costs involve many layers of fees that are collected by 
intermediaries. Digital payments and currency transfers require heavy consumption of human 
and infrastructural assets of financial institutions that act as intermediaries to conduct, clear, and 
settle transactions (Yli-Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park, & Smolander, 2016). Transaction fees are 
significant—McKinsey states that the global payment industry enjoyed a 1.8 trillion dollar 
revenue in 2015 (Bansal, Bruno, Istace, & Niederkorn, 2016). Moreover, it takes several days to 
settle transactions—transactions such as money transfers require nearly three days to settle (Guo 
& Liang, 2016; Kiviat, 2015). Although profitable to the intermediaries, these costs burden the 
parties making the transaction. Blockchain technology might make these transactions faster and 
less costly by eliminating several layers of intermediaries. The decentralized nature of 
blockchain could imply costly layers of redundancy, infrastructural costs, and delays. 
Nonetheless, the reverse could be true because the technology could provide its own cost-
efficiencies—as will be described later. Efficiencies could be gained in the same way that 
double-entry accounting has improved security and reliability despite its redundancy, and 
analogous to how computer technology has improved security and reliability—until cyber risks 
evolved. Blockchain technology could, therefore, be the next step in security and reliability. 
Nonetheless, many challenges and issues would need to be resolved before getting there. 
Financial Transaction Phases Area of Research Focus 
Transaction initiation Data privacy 
Overall 
transaction 
cost 
Verification of asset 
Asset verification 
Data privacy 
Recording information 
Record keeping 
Data privacy 
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I.2 Blockchain Technology 
Blockchain technology was introduced by Nakamoto (2008) to bypass middleman actors 
such as financial institutions by allowing direct peer-to-peer transactions. To achieve this goal, 
Nakamoto suggested a peer-to-peer distributed ledger. In this way, payer and payee can 
exchange directly over the network, utilizing encryption and consensus mechanisms (Guo & 
Liang, 2016; Tsai, Blower, Zhu, & Yu, 2016; Zhu & Zhou, 2016) to make transactions 
tamperproof since any modification to the historical data record is detectable by participating 
blockchain network nodes (B. Lee & Lee, 2017; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). 
One of the fundamental objectives of any payment system is to guard against double 
spending. In other words, the system should be able to track who owns the money and should 
only allow the person who owns the money to spend it once and not more than once. Blockchain 
technology solves the double spending issue through a consensus mechanism (Nakamoto, 2008; 
Pazaitis, De Filippi, & Kostakis) that will be detailed later in this dissertation. 
Blockchain technology comprises several technological and non-technological concepts 
and ideas. The integration of these concepts and ideas allows value exchanges without a trusted 
central institution (Kiviat, 2015). As a result, there is a growing interest in the technology 
because it provides security, anonymity, and data integrity without third-party organizations in 
control of the transactions (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). Although it could theoretically 
disintermediate, in reality, blockchain networks re-intermediate trust away from the center 
(Mougayar, 2016) and form ‘multi-center, weakly intermediated’ schemes (Guo & Liang, 2016). 
The decentralized nature of blockchain technology could also make the data more transparent 
when compared to centralized transactions (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). However, since public 
blockchain network users could opt to act anonymously, a high level of privacy could diminish 
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the degree of transparency from the perspective of entities that need to know more about end 
users. 
Initially, blockchain technology emerged as the underpinning platform for the Bitcoin 
cryptocurrency. However, for the reasons outlined, banks expect it will help them streamline and 
reduce the costs of activities such as international payments and trading settlement (Irrera & 
Shumaker, 2017). This expectation opens the door for a potentially disruptive technology that 
could have broad implications for the financial sector. Zhao, Fan, and Yan (2016) and Mougayar 
(2016) predict that the transformational effect of blockchain technology on enabling trustworthy 
transactions globally will parallel the paradigmatic influence of the Internet on accessibility to 
information. Zhao et al. (2016) further elaborate that decentralized trust—arising from 
blockchain technology—will attenuate costs of transactions that are due to non-technical aspects 
of centralization. Similarly, Guo and Liang (2016) posit that applying blockchain technology can 
resolve many of the efficiency bottlenecks, delays, fraud, and operational risks they assert infest 
the financial industry. Nonetheless, blockchain networks are inherently slow since 1) getting a 
whole network to a consensus on a single truth is time-consuming and 2) peer-to-peer nodes 
have to act both as a client and a server (Tsai et al., 2016). 
I.3 State of Adoption 
Since blockchain technology could offer opportunities to reduce cost and improve the 
speed of transaction settlements, exchanges, banks, and the whole securities industry are 
increasingly interested in the technology (de Meijer, 2016). Moreover, international institutions 
including the International Monetary Fund, and nations, such as the USA, the UK, Japan, China, 
Russia, India, and South Africa have initiated research on blockchain technology applications 
targeting many fields (Guo & Liang, 2016). 
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Recently, international institutions, including the United Nations and the International 
Monetary Fund (Guo & Liang, 2016), as well as central banks in the U.K., China, the USA, 
Korea, Singapore, Japan, Russia, India, Netherlands, and South Africa have recently announced 
blockchain technology plans (Mori, 2016; Tsai et al., 2016). National stock exchanges such as 
Nasdaq; banking titans such as J.P. Morgan; and financial bodies such as the USA Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation and the People’s Bank of China have all started their blockchain 
technology research laboratories (Guo & Liang, 2016; Mori, 2016). Most financial institutions 
have pilot programs for blockchain technology. For instance, R3—founded in 2015 as a 
blockchain technology consortium—has partnered with over eighty financial institutions and 
bodies (R3, n.d.). China Financial Blockchain Consortium (Guo & Liang, 2016) is another 
alliance. Traditional companies have jumped on the blockchain technology bandwagon with a 
variety of offerings. For instance, IBM has built a supply chain blockchain with a mission 
statement to lubricate exchange, enhance trust, increase accountability, and elevate transparency. 
IBM CEO Ginni Rometty stated: “What the Internet did for communications, blockchain will do 
for trusted transactions” (IBM, n.d.). Startups such as Blockstream and Digital Asset Holdings 
already offer financial institutions services that facilitate digital asset dealing (Pilkington, 2015). 
According to Coindesk (2017a), enterprise-oriented blockchain-based projects grew in size, and 
pilot projects continued in partnership with major groups and corporations as summarized in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2: State of Enterprise Blockchain Technology (Coindesk, 2017a) 
I.4 Research Approach 
Even though blockchain technology could impact many aspects of our lives, thus far, 
there are only a few published academic papers that treat the technology from a business 
perspective. aver Research on blockchain technology has been mainly attentive to technical and 
legal topics (Lindman, Tuunainen, & Rossi, 2017) primarily published in practitioner-oriented 
journals and on websites that are targeting Bitcoin evangelists and hobbyists. Over 80 percent of 
the extant literature focuses on Bitcoin systems, and less than 20 percent deals with other 
blockchain technology applications (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016) with most of that focused on 
technological (Beck, Czepluch, Lollike, & Malone, 2016; Lindman et al., 2017; Teigland, Yetis, 
& Larsson, 2013) and legal problems (Bollen, 2013; Ingram & Morisse, 2016; Lindman et al., 
2017). Hence, as blockchain technology permeates, further research in the domains of 
information systems (IS) and management is called for (Giaglis & Kypriotaki, 2014; Lindman et 
Hyperledger expands projects and 
members: 
 
4 top level frameworks including EVM 
code, 130 members, PoCs in finance, and 
working groups in healthcare 
Enterprise Ethereum Alliance is born: 
 
EEA launches with major membership list, 
focused on permissioned Ethereum with 
interoperability with public blockchains 
Corporates expand staffing, R&D labs: 
 
Enterprises, consortia, and working groups 
continue launching pilots, PoCs and tests 
Ripple expands to Japan, completes pilot: 
 
Mitsubishi joins board, 47 bank consortia 
implements cloud-based payment pilot 
R3 continues diverse tests: 
 
Demos Ethereum applications, and 
commercial paper programs 
DTCC (Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation) expands DLT settlement 
trials: 
 
Eying REPO market, working with startups 
including Digital Asset and R3 
 7 
al., 2017; Van Alstyne, 2014). This dissertation contributes to the efforts of bridging this gap in 
knowledge. 
To explore the impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions, this 
dissertation uses a pluralistic method that combines a review of the literature, an analysis of the 
perspectives of key industry players and observers, and a theoretical interpretation through the 
lens of transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1975). A pluralist 
approach that compares and contrasts multiple plausible perspectives on reality is crucial to the 
emergence of rigorous scientific knowledge (Azevedo, 1997; Van de Ven, 2007) as it can 
provide complementary insights and possible synthesis of them to study an emerging business 
phenomenon. Furthermore, using multiple perspectives on a complex business problem 
decreases the likelihood of unintended bias in interpretations (Van de Ven, 2007). 
When utilizing a pluralist methodology, the researcher moves iteratively between data 
and theory (A. S. Lee & Baskerville, 2003) contrasting perspectives and synthesizing findings 
into a holistic account. Consistent with the approach, this dissertation moves between description 
and theory by drawing on a) the intersection of literature about blockchain technology and 
financial transactions, b) interviews with financial industry executives and subject matter experts 
about the impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions, and c) transaction cost 
theory (Coase, 1937; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1975) as a particularly thought-provoking 
theoretical framework that promises insights into the potentially disruptive effects of the 
technology. When applying the first and second methods, we adopt a broad view of the 
phenomenon exploring various types of blockchain technology impacts on financial transactions. 
In this way, we report findings such as technical, regulatory, and adoption issues. Moreover, in 
this case, the term ‘transaction cost’ has a broader meaning to engulf ‘transaction theory’ costs, 
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production costs (Dyer, 1997; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), and transition costs that are related to 
deploying blockchain technology. Nevertheless, when we look through the prism of transaction 
cost theory, we zoom in to solely focus on ‘transaction theory’ costs. 
A detailed account of how the dissertation has applied the pluralist methodology is found 
in appendix A. 
I.5 The Role of Theory 
The field of IS is concerned with studying phenomena that emerge from the interaction 
between technological systems and social systems (Gregor, 2006; A. S. Lee, 2001). As such, the 
use of blockchain technology in any industry satisfies the definition of IS and could be explored 
targeting the four central goals of IS theory (Gregor, 2006). The second goal is to explain how, 
why, and when things occur based on causality and methods of argumentation (Gregor, 2006). 
The third goal is to probabilistically predict what will transpire in the future if certain 
preconditions obtain (Gregor, 2006). Finally, the fourth goal is future-oriented like prediction 
with theory offering a prescription of normative methods and structures for the development of 
artifacts to attain desired outcomes (Gregor, 2006). 
This dissertation provides descriptive accounts and examines opportunities and risks from 
business and societal perspectives (Lindman et al., 2017) to uncover new explanations 
underlying the blockchain technology phenomenon by invoking transaction cost theory to 
explicate the interaction of the financial sector with blockchain technology (Gregor, 2006). In 
part, the goal here is a response to the assessment of Zhao et al. (2016) that research in the 
economic and social validity of blockchain technology applications is lagging because it takes 
more effort to uncover. Additionally, there is a lack of a deep understanding regarding how 
blockchain technology decentralized services are designed, developed, and organized to 
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revolutionize trust (Lindman et al., 2017). In addition, this research seeks to foresee (Gregor, 
2006) the impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions by enlisting perceptions by 
key industry players and observers and by adopting theoretical interpretations. Hence, the final 
integrative goal of this research is to prescriptively (Gregor, 2006) outline insights into how 
financial organizations can prepare for blockchain technology opportunities and threats. 
The transaction cost theory is a fitting theoretical framework for understanding and 
explicating the impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions because blockchains 
could impact how transactions are conducted. Transaction cost theory is interdisciplinary by 
virtue of joining economic perspectives with aspects of organization theory and contract law 
(Williamson, 1979). The theory is concerned with minimizing the cost of transactional activities 
that are not directly attributed to the production of goods and services, and are instead related to 
the cost of searching, bargaining, monitoring, and enforcement activities that are associated with 
the transaction of goods and services (Husted & Folger, 2004). Consequently, a persistent goal of 
transaction cost theory is concerned with organizational boundaries around the decision of 
whether a transaction is more efficiently performed within a firm or outside a firm’s boundaries 
(Coase, 1937; Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). 
Ouchi (1980) defines a ‘transaction cost’ as any activity that is conducted to satisfy the 
expectations of participants in an exchange. Usually such costs are attributed to the difficulty of 
redeploying assets to their next best use—the asset specificity challenge (Husted & Folger, 2004; 
Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985, 1991)—or to the difficulties in measuring 
individual contributions to team effort—the metering problem which is also referred to as 
performance ambiguity (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Husted & Folger, 2004; Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992; Ouchi, 1980). Another problem with perceiving equity is contingent goal incongruence— 
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the degree to which exchange participants have incompatible objectives (Husted & Folger, 2004; 
Ouchi, 1980). 
There are two primitives in transaction cost theory that are closely related to the 
aforementioned notions. First, bounded rationality—the individual’s limitation on receiving, 
sustaining, retrieving, and processing information (Simon, 1955; Williamson, 1973). The second 
is opportunism—exemplified by dodging duties, breaching agreements, and stealing (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Husted & Folger, 2004) as each participant endeavors to maximize their 
advantages in transactions through dishonesty and lack of transparency (Williamson, 1973). 
Moreover, Williamson also specific two more transaction costs determinants: frequency, 
meaning how often a contract is invoked (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1979) and 
uncertainty, comprising ex ante difficulties of anticipating all future scenarios, language 
equivocality, and ex post performance ambiguity. 
Accordingly, Table 3 summarizes the research design for this dissertation based on 
Mathiassen (2017). The table defines the problem setting, the area of concern, the analytical 
framing, the method, the research question, and the expected contribution to the body of 
knowledge. 
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Table 3: Research Design Summary—Adapted from Mathiassen (2017) 
Component Definition Details 
P The problem setting 
represents people’s concerns 
in a real-world problematic 
situation. 
Blockchain technology could offer 
opportunities concerning financial transactions. 
On the other hand, to implement blockchain 
technology there are many technological, 
regulatory, and adoption challenges. 
A The area of concern 
represents a body of 
knowledge within the 
literature that relates to the 
problem setting. 
The impact of blockchain technology on 
financial transactions with specific focus on 
asset verification, record keeping, data privacy, 
and transaction costs 
F The conceptual framing helps 
structuring the analysis of 
data to answer the research 
question. FA draws on 
concepts from the areas of 
concern, whereas FI is 
independent of area of 
concern. 
 
The study will leverage transaction cost theory 
as an independent conceptual framing FI. 
 
 
M The adopted methods of 
empirical inquiry. 
The study adopts a pluralist approach by 
combining three different methods of inquiry: 
Method 1: Extant literature analysis. 
Method 2: Perception analysis based on 
interviews with financial executives, subject 
matter experts, and blockchain technology 
researchers. 
Method 3: Theoretical interpretation of insights 
from Methods 1 and 2 based on transaction cost 
theory. 
RQ The research question relates 
to the problem setting; it 
opens the research into the 
area of concern and helps 
ensure the research design is 
coherent and consistent. 
What is the impact of blockchain technology on 
financial transactions? 
C The contributions to the 
problem setting and area of 
concern and possibly to 
conceptual framework and 
method. 
This study contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge as follows: 
Contribution to practitioners: Insights into how 
financial organizations can prepare for 
blockchain technology opportunities and threats 
CP. 
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Contribution to the literature: A synthesis of the 
extant financial literature related to blockchain 
technology, coupled with empirical accounts of 
industry perceptions of the impact of 
blockchain technology CA on financial 
transactions. 
Contribution to the theory: A theoretical 
interpretation of the phenomenon through the 
lens of transaction cost theory CF. 
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II TECHNOLOGY: BLOCKCHAINS  
Blockchain technology is both an economic innovation—a new architecture for enabling 
humans or machines exchanges without the need of full trust—and a technological innovation—
a novel decentralized ledger that engenders trust (Liebenau & Elaluf-Calderwood, 2016; 
Lindman et al., 2017) because the technology could provide the platform to record transactions 
and share data between participating parties in a more efficient, transparent, and verifiable 
manner (Workie & Jain, 2017). However, disruptive innovations usually surpass the internal 
absorption and usurpation capabilities of established institutions (Mougayar, 2016) and both 
established institutions and startups will have to navigate the regulatory and adoption turbulences 
and technological hurdles as will be detailed later in this dissertation. 
II.1 Blockchain Explained 
To explain how blockchain technology works, we start with a simple scenario based on 
Bitcoin blockchain. In our scenario, Alice wants to use some of her Bitcoins to buy an audible 
book from Bob through the Bitcoin blockchain—Figure 1. 
Figure 1: A Simplified Blockchain-based Transaction 
Alice initiates the exchange by sending a broadcast message to the blockchain network. 
The message contains the electronic address of Bob and the amount required to pay for the 
audiobook. Next, the blockchain network assembles Alice’s transaction information and adds it 
to its public ledger. Then, seeing the payment from Alice, Bob sends Alice the electronic keys to 
Bitcoin Blockchian 
Network 
Alice has some 
Bitcoins and wants 
to buy an audible 
book 
Bob sells 
audible books 
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download the audible book. Based on this scenario, we present the underpinning blockchain 
concepts that explain how the transaction in the scenario works. 
To support the ensuing elaboration of the above scenario, we describe in Table 4 the 
relevant Bitcoin blockchain terms. 
Table 4: Bitcoin Blockchain Terms 
Term Description 
Transaction According to (BitcoinWiki, n.d.) a Bitcoin transaction is 
1. A transfer of value that is broadcasted to the network and 
recorded by the network into a block. 
2. Typically references previous transaction outputs as new 
transaction inputs and dedicates all input Bitcoin values to new 
outputs. 
3. Not encrypted, so it is possible to browse and view every 
transaction ever recorded into a block. 
4. Once buried under enough confirmations it can be 
considered irreversible. 
Block A unit of data in the blockchain that includes a hash of itself, the hash 
of the prior block, and multiple transactions (Narayanan, Bonneau, 
Felten, Miller, & Goldfeder, 2016). 
 
Bitcoin blockchain reached 510188 blocks as of 2018 Feb 20th 
(Blockchain, n.d.). 
Blockchain Is a chain of blocks where each block is cryptographically linked to 
the prior one (Mattila, 2016). 
Blockchain 
Network 
A peer-to-peer arbitrarily connected network with no hierarchy, no 
centralization, and no master nodes; where each full node stores a 
replica of the blockchain and relays info to its connected neighbors 
(Narayanan et al., 2016). 
Node Any computer that connects to the Bitcoin network (BitcoinWiki, 
n.d.). 
Full node A special type of node that fully validates transactions and blocks; 
almost all full nodes also support the network by accepting 
transactions and blocks from other full nodes, validating those 
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II.2 Authentication 
How does the Bitcoin blockchain network and Bob know that Alice authenticated the 
transaction? The answer is digital signature. Alice initiates the transaction by using her private 
key—a password that only Alice knows—to digitally sign, and therefore, authenticate the 
transaction. Paralleling the objectives of a traditional hand-written signature, a digital signature is 
a cryptographic mechanism that utilizes pairs of private and public keys to satisfy four objectives 
(Badev & Chen, 2014). First, only the signatory can sign with her specific signature. Second, it is 
not possible to append the signature to other than the signed documents. Third, the signatory 
cannot deny her signature. Fourth, the recipient can validate that the document has the authentic 
signature of the signatory. Narayanan et al. (2016) explain how the public and private keys are 
generated using a mathematical algorithm such that if Alice signs a message with her private 
key, and Bob knows her public key, then Bob can verify that Alice has indeed signed the 
message and that the message has not been tampered with. Figure 2 depicts this authentication 
scenario. 
transactions and blocks, and then further relaying them to 
neighboring nodes (BitcoinCore, n.d.). 
 
The number of full nodes is unknown. (Bitnodes, 2018) asserts that 
there are 11389 reachable full nodes as of 2018 Feb 20th, but 
estimates by different sources vary significantly. 
Miner A full node that competes to build the next block (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2016). 
 
Estimates vary, but they are thousands Bitcoin miners. 
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Figure 2: Authentication Using Digital Signature—Adapted from Badev and Chen (2014) 
II.3 Content and Verification 
What is in the transaction initiated by Alice? Narayanan et al. (2016) explain how 
transactions are constructed in a Bitcoin blockchain network, in the scenario where Alice intends 
to send some Bitcoins to Bob. The transaction comprises a pointer to where Alice acquired the 
Bitcoins in the historical record of the blockchain, the amount she wants to transfer to Bob, the 
public key of Bob which is the payee's digital address, Alice’s digital signature for the whole 
transaction, and a small transaction fee as an optional incentive for the node that assembles her 
transaction. Figure 3 illustrates the content of the transaction broadcasted by Alice to the 
blockchain network. 
Upon receiving Alice’s transaction, the blockchain network verifies a few items such as 
Alice’s digital signature and her claim of ownership of the Bitcoins. Following the verification of 
the veracity of the transaction, one of the nodes in the blockchain network assembles Alice’s 
transaction into a block of data alongside hundreds of other transactions, and hence, the block 
becomes part of the chain or ledger. The network is now aware that the Bitcoins spent by Alice 
are owned by Bob. By virtue of Alice’s transaction being part of the public ledger, Bob may 
confidently send Alice the keys to the audiobook she bought from him. 
Sender Signs message 
using own private key 
Recipient verifies signature 
using sender’s public key 
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Figure 3: Transaction from Alice to Bob—Adapted from Narayanan et al. (2016) 
II.4 Network Operation 
How does the Bitcoin blockchain network operate? Our scenario is based on the Bitcoin 
blockchain network. Figure 4 depicts the steps of our scenario in more details. 
Figure 4: Alice Transacting with Bob through Blockchain Network 
To contrast and, therefore, appreciate the simplification blockchain technology brings to 
the table, Figure 5 depicts a traditional credit card transaction. 
Input: Pointers to where Alice acquired the Bitcoins 
Output 1: Bitcoins to be transferred to Bob and his public key 
Output 2: Change address—Alice’s public key and change amount 
Signature: Alice’s digital signature of the whole transaction 
Notes:  
• The total of inputs should be equal or greater than the total of outputs 
• When total of inputs is greater than total of outputs, the difference is considered as a 
transaction fee 
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Figure 5: A Traditional Credit Card Transaction (MasterCard, n.d.) 
 
1- Customer buys a good using 
credit card 
2- Merchant’s point-of-sale 
sends customer’s information 
to the acquirer 
3- Acquirer asks MasterCard to 
get authorization from the 
customer’s bank 
4- MasterCard submits the 
transaction to the bank for 
authorization 
5- The bank authorizes and 
responds to the merchant 
6- The bank routes the 
payment to the acquirer  
7- Acquirer deposits the 
payment into the merchant’s 
account 
 
 
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency operating over a public blockchain network. According to 
Narayanan et al. (2016), the Bitcoin blockchain network comprises many nodes that are 
arbitrarily and partially connected to relay information to each other using the blockchain 
protocol. The Bitcoin blockchain network is a peer-to-peer network that has no hierarchy, no 
centralization, and no master nodes. 
Some full nodes participate in the tasks of validating and relaying transactions in the 
Bitcoin blockchain network (Swan, 2015). Such full nodes are called ‘miners’—a metaphor for 
their quest to compete with each other to build new blocks. Since the Bitcoin protocol allows full 
nodes to share their knowledge about transactions with their neighbors, the network guards 
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against double-spending by validating each new transaction against the list of unspent 
transactions in the ledger (Bjerg, 2016). ‘Miners’ are motivated by two monetary incentives 
described by Narayanan et al. (2016). First, each new valid block conceives a set amount of new 
bitcoins that will belong to the builder of that block. Second, the block builder collects the 
transaction fees of all the transactions included in the block. 
Narayanan et al. (2016) go on to explain this operation of a blockchain network. Before a 
‘miner’ builds a new block, she must find a solution for a hard-to-solve mathematical puzzle. 
This endeavor is referred to as proof of work since it requires spending a significant amount of 
computational power to solve the puzzle. That is the reason, on average, it takes nine minutes to 
generate a new block in the Bitcoin blockchain network. Next, other ‘miners’ verify the integrity 
of the newly-built block and append it to the longest chain. The longest valid chain is considered 
the operational blockchain that the network nodes honor and extend. Honoring and extending the 
longest valid chain is another significant component of the consensus mechanism that allows the 
network to function without a central authority. 
II.5 Chain of Blocks 
How are blocks structured? From a database perspective, the blockchain is a series of 
data blocks that are cryptographically chained together (Mattila, 2016) as each block contains the 
‘hash’—a unique short encryption of the message—of the preceding block, and therefore, it is a 
chain of blocks or a 'blockchain'. A hash function produces an easy to compute, but extremely 
hard to invert fixed-length compact ‘hash’ from a message of arbitrary length (Gilbert & 
Handschuh, 2003). Figure 6 illustrates a high-level schematic of a blockchain ledger or database. 
Since the header of the block contains a ‘hash’ of the data of the current block, and the current 
block contains the hash from the previous block, back to the genesis block, the history of every 
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past block predicates the latest block. The ‘hash-chaining’ of blocks makes it extremely difficult 
to hack a blockchain—as we mentioned earlier, it is hard to solve the mathematical puzzle for a 
single block, let alone to work backward to rebuild many blocks that satisfy the required 
solutions. 
Figure 6: Chain of Blocks in a Bitcoin Blockchain (Narayanan et al., 2016) 
Each Bitcoin block is a collection of transactions in the range of 2000 transactions per 
block. Figure 7 depicts a simplified representation of the Bitcoin blockchain ledger. 
Figure 7: Simplified Blocks of Transaction(Narayanan et al., 2016) 
II.6 Blockchain Categories 
This dissertation adopts the definition of blockchain by Mougayar (2016) as “a 
technology that permanently records transactions in a way that cannot be later erased but can 
only be sequentially updated, in essence keeping a never-ending historical trail.” As such, 
immutability is the defining attribute of blockchains. Therefore, except for immutability, which 
must be present in every blockchain, the rest of the attributes exist at varying degrees (Coletti, 
Transaction 
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Transaction 
Block 82 
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Transaction 
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Block 81 
Hash of block 81 
Transaction 
Transaction 
Transaction 
Hash of block 79 
Transaction 
Block 80 
Hash of block 80 
Hash of block 81 
Data 
Block 82 
Hash of block 82 
Hash of block 80 
Data 
Block 81 
Hash of block 81 
Hash of block 79 
Data 
Block 80 
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2015; DeRose, 2015; Pilkington, 2015). The key attributes of blockchain technology are 
distributed ledgers, cryptography, consensus mechanisms, and peer-to-peer transmission (Guo & 
Liang, 2016; Tsai et al., 2016). It is, therefore, a meta-technology that integrates several 
technologies to form a gestalt—greater than the sum of its parts (Mougayar, 2016). 
There are different flavors of blockchains with diverse sets of attributes (Pilkington, 
2015) and varying levels of control that define categories of blockchains. Table 5 illustrates a 
typological distinction between the main categories. These different categories provide flexible 
trust-based services (Lindman et al., 2017) as will be further elaborated later. Each blockchain is 
a standalone database with varying levels of access and control. Public blockchains are 
unconditionally accessible by every Internet user (Buterin, 2015; Pilkington, 2015). At the other 
end of the spectrum, access to an entirely private blockchain is controlled by a central locus of 
governance (Buterin, 2015; Pilkington, 2015). In between the public and private dichotomy, 
there is a continuum (Allison, 2015; Brown, 2014; Pilkington, 2015) of permissioned, hybrid, or 
partially decentralized blockchains (Buterin, 2015; Pilkington, 2015). 
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Table 5: Categories of Blockchains—Adapted from (Guo & Liang, 2016) 
 
 
  
 Public Blockchain Consortium 
Blockchain 
Private 
Participants Anyone Specific groups Centrally controlled 
Credit  
mechanism 
Consensus 
Mechanisms 
Collective 
endorsement 
Self-endorsement 
Bookkeeper All participants Participants decide Self-determined 
Incentive Needed Optional Not needed 
Prominent 
advantage 
Self-established 
credit 
Efficiency and cost 
optimization 
Transparency and 
traceability 
Prominent 
advantage 
Self-established 
credit 
Efficiency and cost 
optimization 
Transparency and 
traceability 
Typical application Bitcoin Clearing Audits 
Load capacity 30-20 times/second 
1000-10000 
times/second 
Varies 
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III APPLICATION: FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
Analogous to how the digital wave disrupted the telecommunication industry, blockchain 
technology is emerging as a FinTech paradigm shift (Guo & Liang, 2016) that promises to 
enhance the efficiency of financial transactions and to transform the global financial network 
altogether (de Meijer, 2015). Leaders of the financial industry expect the technology to disrupt 
the sector. A 2016 survey conducted by McKinsey unveils that approximately 50 percent of the 
executives in the financial industry are confident that blockchain technology will have a 
significant impact within three years (Guo & Liang, 2016; McKinsey, 2016). IBM pronounced 
that 66 percent of banks will have a scalable blockchain-based deployment by the year 2020 
(Fortune, 2016; Guo & Liang, 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). Such predictions demonstrate that 
change is imminent and may materialize within the next few years. Furthermore, the financial 
industry has already begun to undergo a technological revolution (Accenture, 2015; Kiviat, 
2015). To move from general notions of the impact of blockchain technology on financial 
transactions, we focus on four specific issues that play indispensable roles across financial 
transactions. These are asset verification, record keeping, data privacy, and transaction costs. The 
relevance was explained earlier in Table 1 in relation to the three phases of any transaction 
described by Workie and Jain (2017): 1) the initiation phase, where a client accesses the 
blockchain network to buy or sell financial assets 2) the verification of financial assets in the 
blockchain database by involved intermediaries and stakeholders, and 3) the recording of the 
information into the blockchain ledger. 
In this chapter, ‘transaction costs’ have a broader meaning to include transaction costs 
from Transaction Cost Theory as well as production costs (Dyer, 1997) (Dyer, 1997; Zajac & 
Olsen, 1993. In addition, we touch upon transition costs of moving from current technologies in 
financial transactions to a blockchain-enabled environment. 
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III.1 Asset Verification 
The first activity in trading a financial asset on a blockchain network is to verify specific 
attributes of the asset (Workie & Jain, 2017). The asset verification involves confirming that the 
parties who seek to exchange are the legitimate owners of the corresponding assets (FINRA, 
2017). Ownership according to Stephen Pair, CEO of BitPay, is established when some entity 
recognizes, documents, and defends the rights of someone over an asset (Tapscott & Tapscott, 
2016). As such, blockchain technology can facilitate direct ownership verification by virtue of a 
consensus mechanism (Workie & Jain, 2017) that is already agreed upon by all participants. The 
confirmation of the ownership of the asset in the blockchain network is carried by a single full 
node that constructs the block that encompasses the asset information and is also corroborated by 
other full nodes in the network which continuously verify the validity of every new block and the 
overall veracity of the whole ledger. The strength of the blockchain stems from that fact that no 
single custodian—full node—has control over the entire ledger at any time (Rechtman, 2017). 
Instead, it is akin to a majority rule. The apparent risk here is when a single entity controls over 
50 percent of the custodians of the network (Rechtman, 2017). Whether that is likely or not 
depends on the operational environment. 
The immutability attribute of blockchain data makes it possible to store information 
indefinitely in its database. Subsequently, this elevates the level of trust in the veracity of assets 
information on a blockchain. Furthermore, immutability leads to traceability (Mori, 2016) 
because blockchain contains verifiable timestamped records of every asset ever transacted in 
blockchain (Crosby, Pattanayak, Verma, & Kalyanaraman, 2016). Therefore, by virtue of its 
built-in native audit trail, blockchain technology is readily available to verify assets (Rechtman, 
2017). As such, asset verification becomes viable and possibly more reliable using blockchain 
technology. On the other hand, immutability means that it is not possible—especially in a public 
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blockchain—to fix a mistake pertaining to an asset by editing the database. Instead, one must 
append the corrected representation of the asset in a new block. Therefore, immutability affords 
traceability and reliability; nonetheless, it makes it difficult to fix mistakes and human errors. 
Due to the nature of its distributed ledger, it is arguable that blockchain built-in 
redundancy is helpful in significantly reducing the risk of losing assets information (Rechtman, 
2017). Hence, compared to centralized databases, blockchain is more reliable and fault-tolerant 
because clones of the database—chain or ledger—are maintained by multiple network nodes 
(Mori, 2016). If most of the network nodes go down, the network will continue to verify records 
uninterrupted since the database is available in many other nodes and the consensus mechanism 
is independent of the number of operational full nodes. Nevertheless, redundancy comes with the 
price of taxing resources in terms of storage and processing requirement. 
In any case, a decentralized consensus mechanism requires significant infrastructural and 
operational expenses in areas of communication networks, computation, and storage to operate a 
chatty transactional financial system (Tsai et al., 2016; Yli-Huumo et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 
2016). Moreover, it requires effort to integrate blockchain-based asset verification, at scale, with 
the financial legacy platforms and processes; and to enhance the capabilities of blockchain 
technology to meet the requirements of the financial industry (Tsai et al., 2016). Financial 
systems, for the most part, require high throughput and speed—stock exchanges execute over 
100K transactions per second that may require asset verification; hence, blockchain technology 
must be able to handle these types of loads. Moreover, Tsai et al. (2016) state that since the 
blockchain protocols are executed sequentially, it is difficult to meet the financial industry 
requirements no matter how much computational power is added, especially that blockchain 
network is inherently slow because it is peer-to-peer, which means that each node needs to act 
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both as a client and a server. However, some people such as Mougayar (2016) argue that 
scalability is a moving target that has, historically speaking, been met by technological 
innovations and by the pressure of imminent demand. 
From a compliance point of view, before deploying a blockchain-based network, there 
are several regulatory rules concerning asset verification that broker-dealers need to devise ways 
to comply with. Some of these asset verification requirements are established by FINRA and 
Exchange Act Rules (FINRA, 2017). Furthermore, for a global blockchain covered by 
heterogeneous jurisdictions, the task of asset verification from a regulatory framework is further 
complicated (Mori, 2016). 
III.2 Record Keeping 
Record keeping is to resiliently and accurately preserve past information through time in 
a manner that satisfies involved parties (Witte, 2016)—precisely what blockchain technology 
does by design, and as such, blockchain technology is capable of keeping records (DuPont & 
Maurer, 2015). Furthermore, the technology could have a significant impact on record keeping 
(Kiviat, 2015) since it alters centricity and reshapes governance (Guo & Liang, 2016). Currently, 
financial institutions keep records across disparate databases, unlike a shared blockchain ledger 
which affords a central repository where records are accessible by all participating institutions. 
Guo and Liang (2016) asserts that many of the financial sectors’ problems stem from a) 
poor quality of records needed for assessing individual credit, b) inability to share records, c) 
lack of utilization of external sources of records such as the Internet data, and d) difficulties of 
meeting compliance requirements related to customers’ records such as know your customer 
(KYC). According to Moyano and Ross (2017), the annual costs of KYC due diligence per bank 
is up to 500 million dollars. They further conclude that financial institutions should collaborate 
 27 
among themselves, and other stakeholders, to develop blockchain-based record keeping systems 
to address these weaknesses. Such blockchain networks could be permissioned (private with 
appropriate access control) to allow financial institutions (exchanges, central banks, banks, and 
insurance firms) to enhance reputability, accountability, and controllability (de Meijer, 2015) by 
computationally, efficiently, and seamlessly keep records across the financial value chain 
(Kiviat, 2015). Nonetheless, to achieve this desired vision for record keeping, financial 
institutions need to agree on what records to share, how to contribute to the cost of building and 
maintaining the network, and how to manage access control. 
A record of information stored on a blockchain ledger attains further veracity over time, 
and as such, blockchain technology is well positioned to be the source of truth, the provider of 
accurate records, and ultimately, the platform for trust and record keeping due to its immutability 
attribute and consensus mechanisms (DuPont & Maurer, 2015; Mori, 2016). Consequently, 
blockchain technology can natively, seamlessly, and more transparently afford robust audit trails 
of records of dividend disbursements, ownership details, stock split terms, stock transactions 
timestamps, taxes reports, and compliance reporting requirements (Rechtman, 2017). Therefore, 
blockchain technology is a readily available reporting infrastructure (Workie & Jain, 2017) and 
is impactful to auditing and monitoring (Kiviat, 2015) requirements and practices desired by 
financial institutions and regulatory bodies. To attain this collaborative record keeping interface, 
it would require building the appropriate tools and processes. Additionally, inasmuch as 
blockchain data is immutable and irreversible, the industry must innovate solutions for how to 
address issues that may arise from erroneous human or platform record entries (de Meijer, 2015). 
Furthermore, there need to be considerations of computational resources for maintaining a 
blockchain’s growing ledger (Workie & Jain, 2017) that is redundantly stored in multiple nodes. 
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However, the risk here is likely insignificant grounded on Moore’s law that computing storage 
and Central Processing Units (CPUs) tends to get cheaper and faster, thus allowing cheaper 
record keeping and faster record retrieval. Furthermore, if we envision a future permeated by 
machine-to-machine type of transactions, then when pushing the blockchain technology towards 
the internet of things (IoT) periphery, the current blockchain techniques are generally not 
appropriate since IoT devices work with low computational power and are limited to tiny 
amounts of energy consumption (Atzori, 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). 
According to Rechtman (2017), to guard against fraud and errors, financial custodians 
keep records independently, and if a conflict arises between records during reconciliation, then 
the majority win—Figure 8 illustrates the reconciliation process. It is arguable that blockchain’s 
single truth can afford seamless records reconciliation. 
Figure 8: Records Reconciliation (Rechtman, 2017) 
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In late 2015, Nasdaq finalized the first-ever private security record keeping over its 
blockchain, thus leading to a significant reduction of settlement time and the elimination of paper 
stock certification records (Nasdaq, 2015). Some of the financial sectors that could seek to utilize 
blockchain technology to enhance their record keeping practices are a) equity markets, where the 
current process require a slow and manual tracking of records of shares ownership, b) debt 
markets, where the current settlement time is long and involves multiparty, c) repurchase 
agreements, where currently there is risk of settlement failures and lengthy settlement time, d) 
corporate bonds, where blockchain technology could digitize the records of assets and codify the 
necessary calculations, e) derivative market, where records transparency could aid both 
regulators and participants currently struggling to conduct and monitor the intricate post-trade 
records and activities, and f) customer identity management, where a shared blockchain records 
could provide a centralized repository to ease the task (Workie & Jain, 2017). 
Again, there are regulatory requirements that need to be met by a blockchain-based 
deployment vis-à-vis record keeping. For instance, broker-dealers have to comply with 
recordkeeping compliance requirements such as Exchange Act and FINRA rules that mandate 
the minimum length of time for keeping the record, establish the required type of records, and 
detail accessibility to attestations (FINRA, 2017). 
III.3 Data Privacy 
Data privacy is an essential aspect in financial transactions because customers care about 
their data privacy, and consequently, businesses must care as well since it makes good business 
sense to care about the wants of the customers. Besides, financial institutions must comply with 
regulatory mandates around data privacy. We could think about data here to mean two things: a) 
content data that pertains to transactions and the like and b) identity data that provides 
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information about the users of a blockchain network. Furthermore, privacy and transparency are 
two desired outcomes, but sometimes they conflict. While individuals usually care more about 
their privacy than transparency, the collective typically cares more about transparency. 
Blockchain technology can paradoxically and flexibly swing between a continuum of 
high degree of transparency—decentralization of a public blockchain ledger makes the data more 
accessible (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016)—and high level of privacy (Narayanan et al., 2016)—
pseudonymity of users of Bitcoin and similar blockchains is made possible by a lack of a central 
authority that governs the network users as well as by its built-in cryptography. The level of data 
privacy and transparency depends on whether the blockchain network is public, private, or a 
hybrid, in addition to other operational architecture issues—see Table 5. Furthermore, the level 
of transparency is also a function of the how the data is stored in the network since it is possible 
to encrypt the data before sending it to the network. However, if access control is not managed 
well, it can lead to dire consequences (Rechtman, 2017). Besides, although blockchain 
technology could reduce security and privacy risk, it could introduce new issues because of the 
decentralized nature of blockchain network (Workie & Jain, 2017). For example, safeguarding 
private keys is of amplified importance in a public blockchain network. Although stealing private 
keys from a blockchain network user is akin to stealing passwords from users of non-blockchain 
users, the subtle difference is that if a password is forgotten, in decentralized blockchain 
network, it is impossible to retrieve private keys due to the absence of a central authority. 
Some people express concerns that bitcoin and similar blockchains could be used for 
illegal activities encouraged by the anonymity of the users. However, as detailed by Narayanan 
et al. (2016), Bitcoin blockchain is pseudonymous—network identities could be traced to real-
world identities. Also, the culpability of cryptocurrency to criminal activities is not more than 
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cash. Furthermore, since blockchain data is immutable, the fact that there is a permanent trace of 
activities on the ledger could be discouraging to criminals (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). 
Workie and Jain (2017) aver that innovative technologies, when operating in alignment 
with the goal of achieving market integrity and protecting investors, could enhance access, 
efficiency, and transparency. However, they go on to state the need to augment blockchain 
technology with policies that address privacy objectives such as a safeguarding “personally 
identifiable information and trade strategies.” Moreover, they assert that private blockchain 
networks could exclude non-network participants from access to data and, therefore, reduce the 
level of transparency. 
In the views of Guo and Liang (2016), one of the problems facing the financial sector 
stems from the lack of definition of privacy and security terms vis-à-vis ownership of user data. 
It is arguable that the design philosophy of blockchain technology is founded on enabling users 
to control their transactions and their data. Therefore, many blockchain technology advocates 
such as Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) call for shifting towards a society where users are in full 
control of their data. It is not clear if financial institutions will tilt towards the direction of less 
centricity in controlling users’ data. 
The area of user data is further complicated due to regulatory requirements such as KYC, 
Anti-Money Laundering (AML), and customer data protection (FINRA, 2017). Nonetheless, the 
lack of clarity of regulatory and compliance requirements create uncertainty for financial 
institutions when assessing blockchain technology with consideration of privacy and 
transparency requirements. Moreover, since a blockchain network could cross the boundaries of 
multiple jurisdictions, financial institutions must contemplate how to satisfy privacy and 
transparency regulatory requirements in these different jurisdictions. Besides, financial 
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regulators are still comprehending the implications of blockchain technology (Kiviat, 2015). For 
example, the definition of finality in current settlements is radically different from the protocol-
based consensus mechanism in blockchain networks (Mori, 2016). 
III.4 Transaction Costs 
Past technological advancements had conceived substitutes that consequently intensified 
the degree of competition. For instance, Internet financial products have encroached upon the 
market share of traditional financial institutions (Guo & Liang, 2016). In order to survive and 
meet ever-increasing customer’s demands, the financial sector must continuously innovate (Guo 
& Liang, 2016; Zhao et al., 2016) and attenuate transaction costs (Zhao et al., 2016) through the 
deployment of new technologies. Hence, blockchain technology has been touted as the 
innovation engine for financial areas such as clearing and settlement, payment systems, 
operational risks, and insurance (de Meijer, 2015; Kakavand & Kost De Sevres, 2016; Peters & 
Panayi, 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). 
Currently, interbank payments often pass through intermediary clearing houses where 
they get scrutinized through complicated, time-consuming, and expensive processes (Guo & 
Liang, 2016). The technology, according to de Meijer (2015) may reduce the cost of transactions 
and increase their speed in the areas of business-to-business payments and peer-to-peer 
remittance market; and could help in reducing the cost of the securities sector embodied by 
exchanges and traditional banks. Nonetheless, from an implementation perspective, Workie and 
Jain (2017) state that blockchain technology players, rightfully, focus on discrete applications 
that target current pain points of significant inefficiencies with a vision of implement the 
solutions gradually rather than adopting wholesale changes. A somewhat related point is made 
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by Mougayar (2016) who avers that it is easier to adopt decentralization from scratch versus 
from centralized systems. 
Although blockchain technology could allow long-term cost reduction, in the short term 
some upfront expenditure is required to develop a blockchain-based infrastructure. Taking the 
payment sector as a major candidate for innovation through blockchain technology, in the year 
2013 and 2014, 5.4 billion dollars was invested in FinTech innovation (Kiviat, 2015) with the 
anticipation that blockchain technology could revolutionize the infrastructure and lead to new 
business models (de Meijer, 2015; Lindman et al., 2017) that could consequently generate more 
value and save cost. According to a 2016 World Economic Forum report, the investment in 
exploring financial applications of blockchain technology exceeded 1.5 billion dollars (Workie & 
Jain, 2017). 
In addition to the payment and clearing area, the technology could decrease transaction 
costs related to credit information (Guo & Liang, 2016) and significantly reduce the amount of 
time of settlement (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016) enabling near real-time settlement due to its 
network-based consensus mechanism, resulting in saving days of delay. However, the adoption 
of blockchain real-time settlement would require a departure from established procedures for 
lending and borrowing securities and the practice of conducting trades when the market is open 
during specific hours of the day (Mori, 2016). Blockchain technology could automate the back 
office operations in the area of clearing and settlement, and decrease the transaction costs related 
to authentication of trading records by making them transparent to all participating parties (de 
Meijer, 2015). Another target area of transaction costs reduction through the deployment of 
blockchain technology is private equity exchange. To exemplify, NASDAQ established a startup 
called chain.com to furnish a blockchain-based platform for private equity exchanges (Crosby et 
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al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). One of IBM’s goals is to utilize blockchain technology in order to 
reduce coordination costs in capital markets and to streamline settlements in derivatives markets 
(Coindesk, 2017b). In supply-chain finance, blockchain technology could reduce costs of 
financing by automating manual processes and attenuating legal risks through smart contracts 
(Guo & Liang, 2016). 
McKinsey estimates that blockchain technology could a) reduce the cost of a cross-border 
transaction from 26 dollars to 15 dollars, b) lower the annual operational costs by as much as 15 
billion dollars, and c) reduce the annual cost of risk by as much as 1.6 billion dollars (Guo & 
Liang, 2016). A FinTech report estimates that blockchain technology will allow banks to save as 
much as twenty billion dollars in areas of cross-border payments, securities trading, and 
regulatory compliance (Mori, 2016; Oliver Wyman, Anthemis Group, & Santander Innoventures, 
2015). 
Some researchers suggest that the deployment of blockchain technology alone will not 
lead to significant reduction is transaction costs. For instance, Mori (2016) asserts that 80 percent 
of the challenges in the financial industry are attributed to business models and processes, and 
only 20 percent are attributable to technological hurdles. That means introducing blockchain 
technology alone is not enough. To be effective, such efforts must be coupled with fundamental 
changes of established process and business models. 
Blockchain technology could potentially permeate all sectors of the financial industry. Its 
impact will include private securities, insurance, Internet finance, and other financial sectors 
(Wang, Chen, & Xu, 2016). However, in accordance with systems development best practices, 
Tsai et al. (2016) suggest deploying blockchain features in modular and insular forms, with each 
module targeting a specific functionality such as accounting, or trading, but not both. 
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Furthermore, the value of centralization itself should be carefully assessed as stressed by 
Auctus_Team (2017) who warns against forcing blockchain technology as a substitute for 
addressing problems that traditional centralized databases can solve sufficiently well. 
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IV PERSPECTIVE: STAKEHOLDER VIEWS 
As one of the three pillars of the dissertation pluralist methodology, we have interviewed 
sixteen participants with expertise in blockchain technology and the financial industry. The 
views of the stakeholders augment the literature review presented above, and both chapters will 
be analyzed later through the lens of transaction cost theory. Six of the participants held 
executive roles in financial institutions, five were researchers, and five were subject matter 
experts. The diversity of views provided a number of opportunities, challenges, and 
recommendations regarding blockchain technology and its impact on financial transactions. In 
this chapter, we synthesize the participants’ perspectives with a focus on asset verification, 
record keeping, data privacy, and transaction costs. The views are grouped into four areas: 
transaction issue, technological issues, regulatory issues, and adoption issues. As mentioned 
earlier, in this chapter ‘transaction costs’ have a broader meaning to include transaction costs in 
the sense of Transaction Cost Theory as well as production costs (Dyer, 1997; Zajac & Olsen, 
1993); in addition, we touch upon transition costs of moving from current technologies to a 
blockchain-enabled environment. 
IV.1 Transaction Issues 
Participants agreed that financial services are based on trust. Hence, when a transaction 
transpires between two parties, the financial intermediary verifies the asset, records the 
transaction, and ensures that both parties are served satisfactorily: “When buying shares, 
financial institutions guarantee delivery of those shares and the agreed upon payment to the 
corresponding parties. Even if one party defaults, financial institutions absorb that risk by 
delivering to the other party.” Consequently, the intermediary financial institution charges a 
commission for the service. The above scenario exemplifies the type of trust-based service 
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blockchain technology will have to deliver if it were to play a role in asset verification and 
record keeping. 
“Visa today takes 3% of the transaction fee if you pay at a Walmart. Inherently, Walmart 
will include that in the price since most of the transactions are credit card based,” said one of 
the participants. Financial institutions also incur high costs when they go through intermediaries: 
“Clearinghouses trade trillions of dollars daily. They charge a commission for each transaction. 
Although it is an extremely tiny commission, with millions and millions of transactions, banks 
have to pay substantial amounts.” Blockchain technology could afford opportunities to attenuate 
these types of costs. Current financial institutions have been closely linked to central banks, 
partially for regulatory purposes. Stock exchanges, brokers, and banks participate in assets 
verification and record keeping in a manner that is inefficient as it takes a long time and uses 
significant human resources. Some participants believed that blockchain technology would 
reduce transaction costs: “You have to stitch so many different things and pour millions of 
dollars. If you have blockchain architecture, this cost will drastically reduce, because everything 
is connected.” Another participant advocated using blockchain technology as a means “to 
support transactions across geographical distances without a very heavyweight institutional 
arrangement.” Nevertheless, others see the phenomenon as “full of hype and euphoria with real 
potential for only a few use cases.” Along similar lines, a financial executive participant stated 
that “blockchain technology opportunities are limited because of the way the whole asset 
industry is structured right now. Change is not happening, it would require quite a bit.” 
Nonetheless, the majority of participants believed that blockchain technology will further elevate 
that level of network-based trust and furnish a better platform for verifying assets, keeping 
records, protecting data privacy, and reducing transaction costs: “Blockchain technology can 
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codify something of value and assign it a proof of authorship or a proof of ownership, and that 
becomes a digitally codified asset. Which when put on the blockchain will be immutable, 
meaning everybody can publicly verify it via a search and authenticate who owns it, at a specific 
timestamp.” Given that it could be shared publicly, at a much lower transaction cost than we do 
today.” Another participant expressed the current issue with transaction costs as follows: “Today 
in banking for example, if you own a credit card, if you pay merchandise from Walmart, the 
payment has to process through a number of channels, first of all, the card issuer: e.g., Bank of 
America. Also, the transaction has to pass through different payment networks such as Master 
Card.” 
A few of the participants pointed out that, in some regards, we now trust computers more 
than people as exemplified by Uber: “I will get in a car with somebody in the middle of the night 
that I have never met before. Still, I completely trust that the Uber driver has been vetted well 
enough by the network.” Blockchain exemplifies such networks that are capable of asset 
verification and record keeping concerning reputational data. However, like every newly 
introduced technology, blockchain is not fully charted waters as expressed by one of the 
participants: “It is so fascinating, and we still do not understand it. We still do not understand 
some of the negative.” 
Some participants compared the inevitability of the permeation of blockchain-based 
financial transactions to what some countries in Africa and South-East Asia have done regarding 
cellular technologies as “they leapfrogged western economies such as the USA or Canada. I 
could send money from one person to another person, in Kenya five years back. The USA is now 
trying it out. Now all the banks are doing it.” Hence, it is quite possible to leapfrog with 
blockchain technology, not hindered by all the regulations or all the legacy technologies. For that 
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reason, “some of the venture capitalists think the next Apple or Google will come from the 
blockchain world.” Nonetheless, some participants posited that just like the Internet promised to 
decentralize and ended up moving in a different direction, blockchain technology will not deliver 
on all its promises. For example, the current transaction fee structure in a Bitcoin and similar 
blockchains has not fulfilled its promises of allowing microtransactions at low cost. Moreover, 
the quest of decentralization itself could prove to be elusive “It is frequently the case in human 
history that people think that anarchy is a good idea, but it turns out that every time that power 
is put in the hands of people, we end up coalescing into some centralization.” Blockchain mining 
pools is an example of how we are trending towards centralization as time passes. 
Many participants saw inadequacy in the number of transactions per second—
throughput—despite some promising consensus-based mechanisms. Therefore, they suggested 
that the technology is not ready for prime time for financial transactions. In the USA some banks 
have 35 million customers or more. In China or India, some banks have over 100 million 
customers. It is a daunting task for a blockchain to handle that type of volume in real or semi-
real-time: “Imagine, you are at a cashier, and instead of only Visa approving your transaction, 
every participant has to approve it, verify its authenticity, and get to unanimity.” Those are the 
type of challenges that need to be overcome computationally before blockchain technology could 
be adopted widely. Developers have to come up with algorithms that meets current processing 
standards because “when customers go to Walmart, they have expectations that their cards will 
be approved in less than 30 secs.” Contrarily, one of the participants pointed out that although 
instantaneously processed, Visa and similar settlements take several days in the backend. 
Payments fall into two buckets. The first bucket is consumer payments which are person 
to person, person to commercial, commercial to commercial, and commercial to person. The 
 40 
second bucket is treasury payments, and that is bank to bank. The payment sector uses the 
SWIFT (Society for the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) platform to carry 
interbank payment instructions. In the SWIFT network one bank could connect directly to 
another bank, or the case could be it must go through an intermediate bank to exchange the 
payment information with another bank. No one bank is connected to all the banks. Those 
intermediaries collect transaction fees. Going through the SWIFT hob is essential since 
regulations mandate banks to know who is on the other end of the transaction. Nevertheless, 
treasury payments are not slow because of the speed of SWIFT. The speed issue could be due to 
banks holding on payments to check certain things. To resolve these issues, SWIFT is being 
replaced by a new platform called SWIFT GPI (Global Payment Innovation). SWIFT GPI is an 
improvement over SWIFT since it mandates filling some of the payment fields such as the tax 
rates. Moreover, participating SWIFT GPI banks must meet certain service level agreements. 
Against this backdrop, participants in payments sector had no high anticipations from blockchain 
technology in the treasury payments area since SWIFT GPI is resolving speed and transparency 
issues. Additionally, the issue with speed concerning treasury payments is not technological but 
a liquidity issue: “It is bit of a falsehood to think money is flowing all the time, because unless 
value passes from one place to another” via central banks, “it does not really happen. The 
limitation is business days and time zones. Commercial banks are governed by their central 
banks and central banks close. That is a critical component to how fast you can go when you go 
around to the other side of the planet.” 
It is not straightforward to compare the costs of transactions that are blockchain-based 
versus those that are not. For example, factors that contribute to a transaction costs stemming 
from a Visa payment are radically different compared to a cryptocurrency payment—
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computational energy, fees, and so on. Therefore, “transaction costs should be viewed on a use 
case basis and cannot be generalized.” Moreover, use cases differ. For example, “if it takes me X 
amount of dollars to send one bitcoin from one party to the other, that is different from 
transacting a bond. When you start looking at it that way, you also have to look at matching 
architectures.” Asset verification and record reconciliation are not simple, and according to a 
participating financial executive, this is where blockchain technology could make a difference: 
“Let us take Apple shares for example. At any point in time, we need to know who has assets or 
equity in Apple because we need to have the correct info to be able to pay dividends, taxes, tax 
rates, etc. Keeping track of that is very tricky. Therefore, reconciliation is very complex, and 
something takes long. That is where blockchain technology might make a difference.” 
Some participants advocated using blockchain technology for internal operations 
concerning record keeping, asset verification, and data privacy protection: “It does not have to be 
a public or peer-to-peer in the consumer sense. They can use blockchain technology just within 
their ecosystem and start using distributed computing as the way to securely store private 
information.” For example, record keeping, and asset verification processes could indeed take 
advantage of blockchain technology: “hedge funds try to verify assets. They use excel sheets. 
Many things are messed up.” On the other hand, some participants argued that blockchain 
technology is more effective in attenuation transaction costs in large multiparty context: 
“Blockchain technology brings down transaction costs for large multiparty transactions where 
many institutions and people come together such as stock exchanges and the DTCC. For internal 
system concerned with record keeping, inventory management, and the like, there has not been 
much blockchain-based application development.”  
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Potentially, blockchain technology could introduce a massive change regarding how we 
would interact with capital markets: “The way to raise capital today is either you through 
investment banks as a company or through private placements with institutional investors. 
Tomorrow it is going to be a blockchain environment.” Another participant echoed views along 
the same lines: “In the USA alone, only 55% of the people have access to the stock market, and 
these types of new technologies are going to socialize finance.” 
Before applying blockchain technology to enhance asset verification, record keeping, 
data privacy, or transaction costs, it must prove its advantage over established technologies: “You 
use blockchain technology in a use case that is very centralized. Besides, if your system does not 
require any trust because it is a single company, then you probably do not need blockchain 
technology.” Finally, one of the participants stressed the need to objectively contemplate the 
dichotomy of centralization versus decentralization without taking sides. “I listened to Vitalic 
Buterin—the founder of Ethereum—and he realizes that there is just as many good people and 
just as many bad people in both the cryptocurrency world and the banking industry.” Table 6 
highlights the summary of this section. 
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Table 6: Industry Perceptions of Transaction Issues 
IV.2 Technological Issues 
“Most processes are semi-manual, and therefore the sector is looking for ways to 
optimize, automate, streamline, and make transactions faster while maintaining the same level of 
security,” said one of the financial executives while stressing that it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to generate satisfactory profit. Most participants believed that blockchain technology 
could play a major role in improving the processing of financial transactions. According to one 
of the participants, some studies show if blockchain technology is used as an infrastructure, 
transaction cost will decrease anywhere between 25 and 75 percent. However, a few participants 
stated that blockchain technology is meager as architecture or that “it is hype more than better 
technology.” Moreover, financial transaction systems are not just a single system that could be 
Opportunities Challenges Recommendations 
Blockchain technology can 
reduce transaction costs and 
improve asset verification 
and record keeping 
Blockchain technology is 
uncharted waters in the area of 
financial transactions 
Deploy blockchain 
technology only when it 
adds value relative to 
established transaction 
technologies 
 
Blockchain technology can 
improve efficiency of 
record reconciliation 
Current capabilities of blockchain 
platforms do not meet all financial 
transaction requirements 
Deploy blockchain 
technology for large 
multiparty transactions 
Blockchain technology can 
increase access to finance 
and capital markets 
 
Financial institutions find it 
difficult to understand the impact 
of blockchain technology for 
financial transactions 
Compare blockchain 
versus non-blockchain 
transaction costs on a use 
case basis 
Blockchain technology can 
enable leapfrogging, 
especially in developing 
economies 
It is difficult to compare costs of 
blockchain transactions to non-
blockchain transactions 
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simply replaced by a blockchain-based system. They are multiple interconnected systems. 
Consequently, one of the participants posited that “there would not be a chance for a disrupter to 
come and change the way things are set up. Few people would even understand what we do.” 
An executive from the insurance sector described a use case which illustrates how 
blockchain technology is being implemented to enable asset verification, record keeping, data 
privacy and transaction costs attenuation: Today when two people get into an auto accident with 
each other, their proof of insurance is paper insurance cards. The coverage could have been 
canceled. To improve the process of proof of insurance, “we developed a plugin that goes into 
Geico’s or Allstate’s mobile APP.” To exchange insurance information, the two people tap their 
phones together to access “the policy blockchain to get verification of current coverages.” 
Moreover, in the future, authorities could get a feed from the state department of motor vehicles 
of licensed motorist and compare that to that policy blockchain and be able to identify uninsured 
motorist proactively. The policy blockchain is a private blockchain “accessible by participating 
insurance carriers, insurance distribution firms, and brokers.” It uses ‘proof of authority’ as a 
consensus mechanism—the level of access is based on the user’s identity. When the two drivers 
tap their phones together, they get a temporary access to each other’s data. Although the ledger is 
distributed, some of the data is hashed such that participating institutions can only see what they 
want each other to see. Blockchain technology allows different degrees of so-called zero-
knowledge proof, whereby one can, for instance, prove she had a private data at an earlier time 
without revealing its content. For instance, “if I want to confidentially prove that I have the idea 
on a certain date, I would hash it and put the hash on the blockchain. Later, if someone says I 
have the idea, I can prove that I had the idea by showing its timestamped hash on the blockchain, 
and ‘unhash’ it with my public key.” 
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There will always be cryptography researchers working on developing better encryption 
methods. Contrarily, there will always be cryptography researchers looking for ways to break 
encryption. Part of that is driven by the tension between privacy and transparency where, for 
instance, the government believes that it has good intentions when finding ways to break the 
current methods of encryption: “Government wants to have more visibility, and citizens often 
want more privacy. That ongoing is not just related to blockchain technology.” Additionally, 
hackers also play a role in breaking cryptography, and consequently, push researchers to find 
stronger cryptography schemes: “There is no model that humans can build that has perfect 
encryption. Also, in the next 50-100 years, we might see quantum computers that will break all 
methods of encryption we currently have. With the advent of AI (Artificial Intelligence), there 
might be better encryption built with AI. Nevertheless, there could also be better ways to break 
the cryptography by AI.” When someone breaks a hash function, we stop using it and come up 
with a stronger one. Breaking a hash function does not mean that hashed data could be inverted. 
Even after a hash function is ‘broken’ it is still useful for checking data integrity. It is almost not 
possible to recreate the original piece of data. Hence, breaking a hash function is not a danger to 
privacy or the data integrity. However, “we run the risk of the hash losing its proof of prior 
knowledge of something” as we have explained above. 
Another intriguing area related to privacy is identity. There are personal identity data and 
user-generated data. Many participating subject matter experts believed that blockchain 
technology allows users to control the use of their data: “Self- sovereign identity means if it is my 
identity, I should be empowered to share it with whomever I want, whenever I want, but only 
limited to whomever I want. The government can attest to my identity and can authenticate it but 
at the end of the day it is my identity.” 
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Especially with public blockchains, another security issue is “the risk of losing 
passwords” or private keys since no central authority exists to allow retrieval of private keys. As 
such, backing up and storing private keys is crucial. Doing so, however, might compromise these 
private keys. When implementing blockchain technology, in addition to the costs of building up 
the blockchain network and employing blockchain technology experts, there are also security 
costs. It is not clear if blockchain technology security costs are higher than with current systems: 
“Currently they have to safeguard the database. So, they are facing similar issues. However, 
with blockchain technology, cybersecurity may be of a different nature. People cannot take over 
the blockchain, but if they can steal your keys, they can wreak havoc.” Blockchain by itself is 
phenomenally secure, is hard to hack, and even if someone manages to get closer to that, the 
system can upgrade to a different cryptographic protocol and keep it more secure: “Breaking in 
the blockchain is very remote. I do not foresee that happening in the near future. All the stories 
about someone stealing Bitcoins or hacking Ethereum are because of bad coding or bad ways of 
saving private keys.” 
All participants agreed that scalability is a significant technical challenge. Therefore, 
although we have touched on scalability in previous sections, we will treat it here for further 
details. Blockchain is “centralized and fully decentralized at the same time. Therefore, it takes 
long to validate transactions since it has to be one truth and it has to be distributed so that 
everybody has access to it at the same time.” It is not easy for an entire large network, through a 
censuses mechanism, to agree to a single record. That is one of the reasons it is difficult to 
achieve high throughput. Nonetheless, “there are several proposals to increase that.” For 
example, Bitcoin is testing a proposal called ‘lightning’ where transactions could be verified on 
‘sidechains’ and bundled together then pushed to the main blockchain as a single record. In 
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addition to the speed issue, blockchain networks that use proof of work type of consensus 
mechanisms require much energy consumption. Nevertheless, “there are many other 
mechanisms such as ‘proof of stake’ that are faster and more energy friendly.” For private 
blockchains, scalability is less of an issue since the networks are smaller. Another challenge with 
scalability is the sheer size of the blockchain. Blockchain is sequential: “When you have a huge 
number of transactions every second, then the size of blockchain can grow to become 
unmanageable.” That also results in “fewer people being willing to store the entire blockchain,” 
thereby weakening some of the advantages of decentralization. Ethereum has a proposal called 
‘Plasma’ with the idea of storing only part of the blockchain. Of course, there must be a way to 
access the full history when needed. Furthermore, some of the participants reasoned that space is 
“not a big issue because we have already seen solutions in the past such as light nodes that do 
not need to store the full blockchain." Besides, “memory and hard disk space are cheap these 
days.” From a strategic scalability perspective, “it is hard to be aware of all the different flavors 
of blockchains in an arms race to see who can provide better features.” 
The blockchain ledger could accept unstructured data which could pose a technical 
challenge since bad data could go in without governing rules. In a structured database, “there are 
some rules codified in the database, which make sure that the data that goes in is pure and 
pristine. Blockchain has no such rules.” The issue is especially concerning when considering the 
immutability nature of blockchain records: “In a public blockchain it is hard to go back and 
modify the record because one has to get agreement from everyone.” That is precisely what 
happened when Ethereum had to split into ‘Ethereum Classic’ and ‘Ethereum’ since people 
could not agree on whether to rectify the record or not after a hacking incident. In a permissioned 
blockchain, it could be manageable for participating parties to agree to modify the record. 
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Notwithstanding that challenge, this dissertation adopts the core definition of blockchain as 
being immutable. Immutability, on the one hand, is an advantage because nothing is ever lost. 
On the other hand, as we mentioned earlier, it taxes the network computational resources. Many 
of the participants advocated storing data into the blockchain ledger only when there is a need for 
immutability and keeping the rest in a different database that could be accessible by the 
blockchain network. Some of the participants went further to express reservations regarding 
using blockchain as a database: “Many people try to turn it into a database. Blockchain should 
not be used as a database, is not made to be one, and is not very good one if you try to use it that 
way.” Using blockchain as a database is “basically wasting space.” 
A best practice adopted by a consortium led by one of the participants was to build a 
reusable blockchain framework that can “accelerate the building of applications on top of this 
framework.” Leaders of a consultancy recommended staying platform agnostic: “We see 
advantages in being platform agnostic and have the choice between all different platforms. We 
believe that there are use cases for every one of them.” Each blockchain platform has its 
technical advantages and disadvantages. For example, Ethereum is suitable for smart contracts 
while Ripple is a better fit for payments. As such, a participant who led a consortium averred that 
building an interoperability layer is vital: “One of the things that we have built into our 
blockchain framework, and again this is very bleeding edge, is an interoperability layer.” 
Table 7 highlights the technical opportunities, challenges, and recommendations related 
to blockchain technology in the space of financial asset verification, record keeping, data 
privacy, and transaction costs. 
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Table 7: Industry Perceptions of Technological Issues 
IV.3 Regulatory Issues 
Since it deals with public money, the financial sector is “one of the most regulated 
industries in the USA.” Regulations are essential to protect the public from being subject to 
misguidance, robbery, “Ponzi schemes,” and other types of mischiefs. Although blockchain can 
be used to bypass regulations and intermediary financial institutions, participants argued that no 
matter how the technology is developed, it “will end up landing somewhere in a jurisdiction” 
Opportunities Challenges Recommendations 
Blockchain technology 
could further automate 
many financial 
transactions processes 
 
It is hard to keep up with the 
technical features of different 
blockchain platforms 
 
The need for immutability 
qualifies if the data should go 
into blockchain or not 
Blockchain records are 
stored redundantly and 
cryptographically secure, 
making it hard to lose or 
hack 
 
Provisioning access in a 
permissioned blockchain is 
complicated 
Access provisioning schemes 
are critical for competing 
entities to be comfortable with 
having data in a common 
blockchain 
Blockchain affords a 
central collaborative 
repository for record 
keeping 
 
Hash functions are almost 
guaranteed to be broken in 
the future 
 
Build the blockchain framework 
in a manner that is extendable to 
broad use cases 
Blockchain can fit the 
desired shades of privacy 
and transparency 
 
Blockchain throughput is 
currently not adequate for 
some financial applications 
Remain blockchain platform 
agnostic 
 
Blockchain enables users 
to control their private 
data 
It is not possible to retrieve 
lost private keys in 
blockchain 
Device secure practices for 
storing blockchain private keys 
 50 
Some laws will be federal, and others will be state laws: “In the European Union (EU), there will 
be federal laws at the EU level, and there will be laws specific to each country.” As such, 
blockchain technology will be regulated like other financial services technologies where 
regulations vary greatly from country to country with “some common denominators to account 
for global concerns such as KYC and AML.” Regulating blockchain technology could, therefore, 
be challenging and “confusing because the beauty of decentralized networks is not having 
borders, although we still have borders and live in physical places. There are rules and taxes 
that we cannot just end on a dime.” In any way, some of the participants cautioned against 
overregulation: “Overregulation is not good because it stifles innovation.” 
The technology is still new and evolving making it difficult for the regulators to have a 
good grasp of how it works: “The problem is that the regulators themselves do not understand 
how cryptocurrencies or blockchain technology works. This is a new and evolving technology.” 
From a regulatory point of view, there are two schools of thoughts: the first advocates pushing 
new laws right now; the second advocates waiting and monitoring patiently to see what type of 
new laws will be required. Which school of thought prevails “depends on what the technology 
ends up facilitating.” It also depends on if ‘catastrophic’ events transpire as exemplified by one 
of the participants: “It is only a matter of time. In 2008 banks went bankrupt. The regulations 
were missing certain areas that caused the collapse of the banks. Then the government bailed out 
the banks causing a massive loss for the economy. It took more than ten years to recover.” 
Hence, right now the regulators ought to start thinking how to regulate blockchain technology 
and in what form without crippling innovation. A US-based participant argued that the state of 
regulatory uncertainty is hurting the growth of blockchain technology: “The largest problem is 
the regulatory framework. The USA is behind. Uncertainty is hurting blockchain technology. 
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Only 12% to 18% ICO (Initial Coin Offering) is based in the USA. The country waited for too 
long.” Nonetheless, some participants expected regulations to solidify in the coming one or two 
years: “In the range of a one or two-year timeframe we could expect to see some regulatory 
guidance and control in place.” 
Current regulations have been tailored for a “financial ecosystem that we have developed 
over the past 100 to 200 years.” The regulatory framework will have to adapt to the new 
financial practices we are creating. Regulations typically lag innovation: “Regulations are 
always two phases lagging behind the maturity of the technology.” Moreover, regulations take 
time: “There are many approvals required, notices of proposed rule meeting—meaning making 
regulations based on feedback from the industry—or passing bills such as the Dodd-Frank Act.” 
Still, in some blockchain-related areas, we already have some regulations: “There are pockets of 
cryptocurrency or blockchain technology where there are regulations right now.” For instance, 
Bitcoin futures are now listed on Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Chicago Board of 
Exchange—both are well respected financial institutions that are regulated by the Commodity 
Future Trading Commission. 
When asked whether incumbents or startups will spearhead blockchain technology, 
executives in the financial industry answered in favor of the former. They reasoned based on 
regulations: “Regulatory requirements are the biggest hurdle for a blockchain-based alternative 
provider to be a disruptor and start offering services as we do.” Incumbents already adhere to a 
comprehensive set of regulatory and compliance requirements. As such, their answer implicitly 
averred that blockchain-based services would be heavily regulated. One of the participants 
illustrated the challenge facing new entrants as follows: “Google or Amazon tried to develop 
their own bank. Their CEO admitted that it was more complicated than they thought it would be. 
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That was just plain vanilla capital banking or commercial banking. I do not think they could 
venture into corporate banking, investment banking, the whole payment industry, or securities.” 
Financial institutions spend a large part of their budget on compliance. Some participants 
stated that compliance costs are by far the primary cost factor: “We spend more money and time 
on people who look after compliance than we spend on people who serve clients.” As such, 
blockchain technology could potentially attenuate the compliance-related processes, and 
therefore, significantly reduce financial transaction costs. The idea is to store customer’s 
information into a shared blockchain ledger instead of each financial institution vetting every 
customer on their own: “Blockchain technology is a fantastic way to comply with KYC. All you 
have to do is to put the data on the blockchain, and anyone can use an App to verify.” Of course, 
this should be done in compliance with regulations governing customer data privacy. 
Blockchain technology can be used for positive and negative purposes. Some participants 
expressed concerns about using its cryptocurrency for illicit activities such as “drug trafficking, 
arms smuggling, or any illegal activity such as requesting ransom payments.” At some point in 
time “China banned Bitcoin. Banning is not a solution, but you need to have effective controls to 
avoid illegal activities.” North Korea, given the type of scrutiny put on its transactions, is 
allegedly channeling money through Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Hence, the recent 
appreciation of cryptocurrency is partially attributed to higher demand generated by North Korea 
and the like. 
When computers and the Internet sprung into existence, there was a need for some 
regulatory arrangements to allow authorities to snoop on suspects’ hard disks and online 
activities to check for illicit activities such as child pornography and terrorism. There might be 
“a need for some extra sort of blockchain sensors” to achieve similar objectives. In any case, the 
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nature of privacy-related regulations “will vary greatly from country to country, from Estonia 
where everything is on blockchain, to countries where they will take many years before doing 
anything.” 
Blockchain technology could challenge some of the established data privacy norms. For 
instance, today, in the USA, three credit bureaus have the oligopoly on credit scores of people: 
Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion. If the USA has something like Lithuania’s identity 
management blockchain, anybody can check out credit scores and other details. That will be a 
significant change to how asset and record verification are conducted. Furthermore, the presence 
of blockchain technology could surface some renewed regulatory questions: “Who authorized 
Equifax to collect data on me?” Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion are not governmental 
entities; they are private companies. What are the users’ rights “regarding Equifax securing their 
identity?” “Who authorized Equifax to share their data?” and “What do they gain from Equifax 
sharing their data?” Users may gain access to services by virtue of their identity information 
being shared. However, there are no direct monetary benefits to the user. Hence, blockchain 
technology can alter the landscape of credit rating agencies: “People can even obtain a return 
from their data. That would affect the business model of credit rating agencies and may reduce 
their profits. They might even cease to exist.” 
One of the participants explained the regulatory framework surrounding blockchain-
based financial transactions as follows: “Mycelium is a smartphone App that taps into Bitcoin 
blockchain.” A person could be living anywhere in the world and be able to send and receive 
money to anyone anywhere. Having Mycelium is akin to having a global bank account “without 
having to go to a place and give my photo ID or registration. I just downloaded the app.” That 
puts a different burden on regulators since today, “regulators are used to work through the 
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banks.” As such, regulators have shifted the burden of enforcing the prohibition of activities such 
as money laundering to the banks. The authorities just audit the bank’s ledger. With the presence 
of Mycelium, the regulators must pivot, change, and adapt to a different way of looking at 
transactions. Hence, KYC is no more like a person going into a place giving her identification 
card. KYC in the future “will mean who is downloading the information? What is the serial 
number of the device? To whom is the device registered?” There will be an expanded network of 
things coupled with a rich web of activities that the authorities could tap into to know the 
customer. The authorities will have to crawl these different pieces of information and stitch them 
together to get a reasonable picture of the customer. 
Nivaura, a UK-based company, “just a few weeks ago issued the first regulated bond in 
collaboration with the British regulator.” Nivaura resolved the technical aspects and engaged the 
regulator to agree to two things: 1) this is a financial instrument that lives in a public blockchain, 
and 2) it is a legal instrument, meaning that parties involved in the transaction have legal 
obligations they must adhere to (if not, one party could drag the other into the court of law). This 
is an illustrative “example of innovative companies engaging with regulators to expand the 
regulations in a way that makes sense in this blockchain real world” related to asset verification, 
and record keeping. A different example refers to the ‘proof of insurance’ example detailed 
earlier. In this case, the road had already been paved from a regulatory standpoint since every 
state in the USA had already agreed to honor electronic verification of proof of insurance. 
Notwithstanding other use cases could summon more restrictive requirements from regulators, 
especially with regards to data privacy, asset verification, and record keeping.  
Finally, blockchain technology could offer a collaborative platform that is also helpful to 
authorities in terms of streamlining the reports required by the regulators from financial 
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institutions: “It is a big arduous task for them to gather that information across various back 
office systems. If you have the information on the blockchain, you could very easily create a use 
case to do all that regulatory reporting very quickly and cut out many working hours required 
for that.” Table 8 summarizes the perceptions of the industry stakeholders on regulatory issues 
concerning the impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions. 
Table 8: Industry Perceptions of Regulatory Issues 
IV.4 Adoption Issues 
The current financial ecosystem operates based on well-established processes and 
methods of transaction. With the introduction of blockchain technology, we can transact, verify 
assets, keep records, and protect data in a decentralized fashion with fewer intermediaries and 
fewer loci of control, thus, enabling a consumer-to-consumer web of transactions. Nonetheless, 
some participants questioned some of the core value propositions of blockchain: “To say you 
have a private blockchain, why even have a blockchain? Why not just have encrypted hard 
drives?” Other participants countered: “Who will maintain the common central database? You 
Opportunities Challenges Recommendations 
Blockchain technology can 
reduce financial transaction 
costs related to compliance 
Blockchain technology is new 
and evolving, making it hard 
for regulators to grasp 
 
Regulators should guard 
against overregulation so as 
not to stifle innovation 
Blockchain offers an 
immutable trail of records to 
authorized auditors 
The state of regulatory 
uncertainty is hurting the 
growth of blockchain 
technology 
 
Regulators should adapt to 
emerging paradigm shifts in 
financial transactions 
Blockchain-based platforms 
can furnish a streamlined 
and collaborative reporting 
infrastructure 
Blockchain-related regulations 
will vary accross jurisdictions, 
challenging the borderless 
nature of blockchain 
Innovators should 
collaborate with regulators 
to back their products with 
authoritative power 
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have several banks, and each has its own interests. A central party, such as a stock exchange, 
will have monopoly power and will charge other parties. Blockchain technology allows 
decentralized environment management without relying on a central party.” Depending on how 
compelling the new technology is, the availability of resolutions of some of the challenges, and 
the degree of willingness to embrace, the financial transactions ecosystem might adopt the 
emerging technology at varying rates and degrees or might reject it all together. One of the 
participants averred: “The current ecosystem is not sophisticated enough to fully disintermediate. 
It may take 10 to 20 years to get there. Will there be a pure peer-to-peer transaction? That 
depends on the use cases and the relative value it creates.” 
The RiskBlock is an insurance consortium. They use a social concept called ‘proof of 
collaboration’ to encourage and monitor the effectiveness of blockchains shared among a number 
of highly competitive insurance companies that are typically cautious about how much 
information they share with each other and how much they work together: “One of the first 
hurdles that we had was to be able to prove that these competitors could come together on these 
various solutions and work together.” Regardless of the quality of the underlying solution, a 
shared blockchain would not be useful if participating parties are not willing to work together: 
“It does not matter how good the proof of insurance is if it is one-sided.” From a data privacy 
perspective, the starting point is public blockchain where everyone can see all the data records, 
although they may not see the identities of who are conducting the transactions. However, 
financial institutions do not want all their data to be public: “Some of them are legally bound 
from disclosing all their data.” Even if the data is encrypted, there is a risk that “someone could 
break the cryptography or reverse engineer the data.” The successful adoption of the RiskBlock 
for asset verification, record keeping, and data privacy protection is driven by the demonstration 
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of immediate benefits to the participating parties such as “reduced cost, enhanced efficiencies, 
customer service improvement, and greater revenue.” As such, consortiums must focus on 
bringing true production value to their members: “Our motto is 'no science experiments' such as 
proof of concepts and standalone projects that never make it into production." 
“No organization wants to be a dinosaur when significant changes transpire,” said one of 
the participants. Large financial service providers are, therefore, exploring blockchain 
technology by typically building pilot projects on top of the Ethereum public blockchain 
platform where implementations may be private, or may utilize some other framework such as 
Hyperledger—an open source blockchain technology development consortium. Many financial 
institutions have their in-house research teams. For instance, Bank of America, one of the biggest 
banks in the USA, has already filed for more than twenty-five patents in the area of blockchain 
technology. A participating financial executive stated that incubating blockchain technology 
projects is inevitable because “I fear that something might come along with blockchain 
technology that I did not see, and I lose positioning.” Another participant echoed views along 
marketing lines: “Every bank in London has blockchain technology projects, mostly so they can 
just say they have one.” Even technology giants such as IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle offer 
various implementations of the technology. However, many of the implementations are 
exploratory in nature: “Blockchain technology projects are fairly small-scale operations, and for 
the most part it is more about trying to figure it out.” Financial institutions are hesitant to spend 
heavily or build their own new private network within their organizations since: “CTOs, CIOs, 
and CFOs are waiting until blockchain technology is mature before they spend the money.” 
Nevertheless, there are high anticipations of growth: “I envision that in the next couple of years, 
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the growth will speed up, and people who initially doubted blockchain technology will realize its 
potential.” 
Some sectors are more advanced in their roadmap than others: “The Australian stock 
exchange is going to move all their settlement on blockchain making it much more efficient. The 
verification will depend on cryptography. The transaction will ensue instantly.” The participant 
continued: “Traditional financial transactions such as stocks and bonds will still take place on 
established stock exchanges such as Nasdaq or NYSE (New York Stock Exchange), but they 
might move their settlement to a blockchain.” Senegal and Tunisia already have their currencies 
on blockchain. Singapore and China are thinking about coming up with national digital 
currencies “because of the transaction cost. It will boost the GDP by 3 to 4 percent just by 
replacing 30 to 40 percent of the national currency with cryptocurrency due to the reduction of 
friction.” 
Blockchain-based startups will force incumbents to reduce transaction costs: “Visa and 
MasterCard are now a duopoly in the payment sector. If we have many other options then, 
especially internationally, they have to reduce their fees drastically to remain competitive.” In 
essence, startups are innovating. However, established financial institutions are not sitting still. 
As such, “blockchain technology will disrupt many businesses like how Apple changed the 
Newsweek.” Overall, “the winner might be the customers because they will enjoy better service, 
faster transactions, more transparency, and to some extent they will be more in charge of their 
own data and their own assets.” Nonetheless, it is difficult to realize the possibilities of a new 
technology as exemplified by one of the participants: “In my daily routine, when I ask operation 
people: Can blockchain technology apply to this or that? The answer is always no.” 
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As an adoption roadblock, the dichotomy between privacy and transparency is not a 
technical issue but a business choice concerning the balance between confidentiality and 
verifiability: “If you encrypt data, then you increase privacy and confidentiality, but you lose 
transparency and verifiability. This tradeoff will always be there. There is no technical solution 
to that. It is a business decision.” Public blockchain networks allow high degrees of anonymity 
but “we cannot have a system where people do things completely anonymously.” There are 
different blockchain networks with different objectives from a privacy perspective. ‘Zcash’ and 
‘Monero’ are the type of blockchain networks that claim to offer full privacy protection. 
However, participants believed that no blockchain is fully anonymous because one could track 
transactions back to a user’s activities and patterns. Concerning asset verification and privacy, all 
participants believed that it is easier to track blockchain-based transactions than tracking cash 
transactions.  
A general challenge is how to maneuver the idea of blockchain technology “in an aligned 
way of using it within the existing system and then in a radically new way of pulling things apart 
so you can do things in new ways.” Overall, adoption is more concerned with desired business 
outcome than with technology: “I would be more interested in getting a technology that helps me 
measure and manage liquidity. If a specific technology makes that possible, I will buy.” The fate 
and rate of adoption, therefore, hinges on creating relative value out of the technology. 
Consequently, viable ecosystems emerge around the technology: “Without the ecosystem, the 
technology itself is just sitting in a lab.” 
Another significant challenge is how to settle around standards that all the industry 
players will adopt. There are consortiums such as the R3 consortium and the Ethereum alliance. 
They sometimes call themselves a financial institution or a standard, but the adoption of which is 
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not unanimous. For example, “Goldman Sachs used to be part of R3, then they left later probably 
because they have different goals.” 
There are several adoption challenges related to maintenance and governance: “In a 
private blockchain network, who should be an admin?” “If any dispute occurs, who resolves it?” 
“Who manages the blockchain infrastructure?” “If a new version is out, who is responsible for 
release management?” These are the type of challenges financial executives must think about 
when planning to adopt blockchain technology. 
A participant explained a framework for adopting blockchain smart contracts in which 
blockchain technologies could be used for two types of smart contracts. The first type is a simple 
encounter smart contract that is evoked repetitively. The second type is relationship smart 
contract that attempts to solve ongoing equivocal problems that might need intermittent human 
interaction. As such, the adoption of blockchain smart contracts becomes more accessible by 
thinking about them as partially automated: “Enabling them to get on with the job as much as 
possible and to only interact with them when needed.” As such, smart contracts could be adopted 
faster by making a conscious decision to “codify more into the automatic part and less into the 
human part. To solve an equivocal problem, it might need more human assistance.” 
A participant recommended adopting blockchain technology in a controlled way: “As a 
banker, rather than jump in, which could bring numerous problems I could not think of, I would 
cautiously watch the technology as it matures, then adopt it in a controlled way. Banks deal with 
billions of dollars. The accountability and penalties are extremely high.” Some participating 
consultants offer a strategic path for adoption: “The technology is evolving and improving so 
fast. So, it is a strategic decision to invest now while it is still developing to gain a head start.” 
The summary of this section is found in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Industry Perceptions of Adoption Issues 
 
  
Opportunities Challenges Recommendations 
Adopting blockchain 
technology reduces reliance 
on central authorities that 
may charge service fees 
 
It is hard for financial 
institutions to adapt to 
collaborating and sharing 
information with competitors  
 
Invest early while 
blockchain technology is 
still developing to gain 
competitive edge 
The growth of blockchain-
based startups forces 
incumbents to innovate and 
reduce transaction costs 
 
Financial institutions will 
unlikely invest heavily in 
blockchain technology before 
it is mature 
 
Demonstrate tangible 
relative value of blockchain 
technology projects and 
consortiums 
Adopting blockchain 
technology reduces opacity, 
increase speed, and 
democratizes users’ data 
 
It is hard to settle on standards 
for blockchain transactions 
that all industry players will 
adopt 
Align blockchain 
technology with established 
systems while exploring 
radical innovative ways 
 
Partial adoption of 
cryptocurrency reduces 
friction and increases a 
nation’s GDP 
 
The benefits of adopting 
blockchain for internal 
transactions are not clear 
Adopt blockchain 
technology in a controlled 
way 
The dichotomy between 
privacy and transparency is 
a business decision, not a 
technical limitation 
 Device sound plans for 
governance and 
maintenance of the 
blockchain 
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V THEORY: TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we add a theoretical perspective on the impact of blockchain technology 
on financial transactions by applying transaction cost theory to analyze the insights from our 
literature review and stakeholder perceptions. Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) provide a general 
transaction cost analysis of blockchain technology independent of industry. We build on and 
extend their work by presenting a transaction cost analysis for financial transactions. 
Specifically, we explore the transaction cost theory activities comprising searching, bargaining, 
and controlling (monitoring and enforcement) (Hennart, 1993; Husted & Folger, 2004; 
Williamson, 1985) to shed light on how the adoption of blockchain technology will affect the 
transaction costs related to asset verification, record keeping, and data privacy. We also go 
beyond the analysis of Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) by examining not only where blockchain 
technology attenuates transaction cost but also where it increases transaction cost. Finally, to 
compare transaction costs between traditional technologies and blockchain technology, we 
assume that the blockchain network is already up and running. This assumption allows us to 
avoid the complications in comparing sunk costs that are related to established technologies with 
implementation costs that are related to deploying blockchain technology. 
Transaction cost theory is concerned with the costs of transactional activities that are not 
directly attributed to the production of goods and services but are instead associated with the cost 
of searching, bargaining, and controlling activities that accompany the transaction of goods and 
services (Husted & Folger, 2004). Owed to the benefit of competition, transaction cost theory 
assumes a priori that markets are more efficient than hierarchies (Geyskens et al., 2006) and then 
moves on to define when hierarchies are better. Coase (1937), the founder of transaction cost 
theory, established that vertical integration into hierarchies applies when transaction costs are 
lower compared to the forces of free markets. The theory was further developed by Williamson 
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(1985) specifying contracting between the firm and its stakeholders—customers, employees, 
partners, creditors, and suppliers—as the focus of analysis (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). 
According to Ouchi (1980), transaction costs appear primarily due to the difficulty of 
evaluating the goods or services that are transacted. As such, transaction costs in Ouchi's view 
are due to activities that advance the goal of guaranteeing the expectations of the exchange 
participants. He further posits that the difficulty in achieving such a goal may be attributed to 
lack of trust between the parties. Williamson posits that transaction costs are determined by:  
1) Frequency, meaning how often a contract is invoked (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 
1979). 
2) Asset specificity, referring to whether the asset could be deployed to a different purpose 
(Husted & Folger, 2004; Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979), and therefore, raising the 
concern of goal incongruence (Ouchi, 1980) which is defined as the degree to which parties to 
an exchange have incompatible objectives (Husted & Folger, 2004). 
3) Uncertainty, comprising ex ante difficulties of anticipating all future scenarios, language 
equivocality (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1975), and ex post performance 
ambiguity concerning the difficulty of measuring performance (Ouchi, 1980) or in other words, 
the metering problem related to the intricacy of assessing the level of contribution of each 
individual or entity to a joint effort (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Husted & Folger, 2004; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). 
4) Bounded rationality, positing that people have limited ability to store, process, and retrieve 
information (Simon, 1955; Williamson, 1973). 
5) Opportunism, exemplified by dodging duties, breaching agreements, and stealing (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Husted & Folger, 2004; Williamson, 1979). 
 64 
V.1 Searching 
Searching costs involve ex-ante activities (Husted & Folger, 2004) that are related to 
gathering information to support transactions such as identifying counter partners (Dyer, 1997), 
verifying assets, searching for information related to KYC, and gathering reputation data to 
assess credibility. Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) list three distinctive characteristics concerning 
blockchain technology search: 1) in a blockchain realm, the user can control the level of their 
privacy, 2) unlike the Internet which tends to present information that is unreliable, perishable, 
and abundant, blockchain information is tamperproof, permanent, and not as abundant, and 3) 
information on a blockchain is not just a snapshot at a specific time, it is a chronological account 
or a state machine in the words of Mougayar (2016). As such, we proceed to cover how each of 
the above blockchain technology attributes affects the searching cost in financial transactions. 
First, from a data privacy perspective, by virtue of blockchain technology empowering 
customers to control their data, customers can enter their correct expansive identity record 
elements, hence, arguably increasing its veracity and richness. Consequently, credit reporting 
agencies would not need to extensively search multiple data sources to draw an accurate view of 
the customer’s profile. In this way, the cost of searching blockchain is lower in terms of human 
power and effort since credit reporting agencies do not have to search disparate data sources that 
might have a lower quality of records or conflicting records of information. As such, it is helpful 
to service providers who according to Guo and Liang (2016) suffer from poor quality of records 
needed for assessing individual credit. Hence, Guo and Liang posit blockchain technology could 
decrease ‘searching’ transaction costs related to credit information. On the other hand, it is also 
arguable that due to opportunism, users being in charge of presenting their own data may falsify 
their records or be less transparent about them. Consequently, searching risk costs could increase 
by requiring more expenditure in searching multiple reputational elements to arrive at 
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appropriate user risk profile assessments. Since users of a blockchain, especially a public one, 
could be pseudonymous, the cost for searching users’ private data could also increase in this 
case. Moreover, some of the data entered by the users could be encrypted making it impossible to 
search or use without the permission of the user, thus, incurring additional searching costs. In a 
blockchain, the data is phenomenally secure and conserved; however, if someone loses their 
private keys, then there is not a way to retrieve the password. Consequently, it is plausible that 
users who lose their private keys would create new identifications, and therefore, generate 
multiple profiles, resulting in increased costs of searching due to duplications and fragmentation 
of their data. Searching costs could also increase if people, empowered by blockchain 
technology, choose to monetize their identity data and their content data. In any case, Workie 
and Jain (2017) posit that blockchain technology eases customer identity management due to its 
shared, centralized repository. 
Second, blockchain records are tamperproof, permanent, and less abundant. Being 
tamperproof attenuates the likelihood of opportunistic behavior exemplified by participating 
entities attempting to falsify records, therefore, increasing the cost of searching for data elements 
to verify assets and keep records. When the information is less abundant it decreases the effect of 
bounded rationality, and consequently, reduces searching cost for asset verification and record 
keeping, as well as the search of users’ private data—a similar conclusion reached by 
Williamson (1975) who avers that the ease of verification is critical to the operation of capital 
markets. One of the reasons blockchain records and private data are permanent is immutability. 
Immutability of the blockchain records increases the fidelity of the information on the 
blockchain. Once a search for a particular record at a specific timestamp is run, the results will 
always be valid. Therefore, no costly repetitive search is needed. In addition to immutability, the 
 66 
permanence of blockchain data is also guaranteed by the nature of its distributed ledger, since, 
compared to centralized databases, blockchain ledger is more reliable and fault-tolerant owed to 
the clones of its ledger that is maintained by multiple network nodes (Mori, 2016). If most of the 
network nodes go down, the network will continue to verify records uninterrupted since the 
database is available in many other nodes and the consensus mechanism is independent of the 
number of operational full nodes. Therefore, the built-in redundancy could significantly reduce 
the risk of losing records and private data (Rechtman, 2017). As such, the cost of inability to 
search records is reduced owed to lack of risks of downtime due to failure or congestion. 
Third and finally, blockchain is a state machine, meaning that events or records are 
chronologically and immutably documented on the blockchain ledger. In this context, 
immutability means it is impossible to correct past records on the blockchain. As such, the 
immutability of records and private data could increase searching cost since one has to search for 
the latest update of the record, which could have multiple versions of it. This is especially true in 
a public blockchain where a high degree of goal incongruence could make editing a past 
blockchain record extremely difficult since it requires the consensus of many participants. In 
private blockchains, goal incongruence is arguably less, hence, it might be easier for 
participating entities to align around a protocol on how to edit or purge records. 
To illustrate searching transaction costs analysis, we turn our attention to two financial 
transaction activities: record reconciliation and KYC. Blockchain technology could significantly 
help record reconciliation—a combination of asset verification and record keeping. The savings 
in searching costs associated with reconciliations are significant as corroborated by the 
stakeholders perspective asserting that blockchain technology would help reconciliation: “Let us 
take Apple shares for example. At any point in time, we need to know who has assets or equity in 
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Apple because we need to have the correct info to be able to pay dividends, taxes, tax rates, etc. 
Keeping track of that is very tricky. Therefore, reconciliation is very complex, and something 
takes long. That is where blockchain technology might make a difference.” According to 
Rechtman (2017), to guard against fraud and errors, financial custodians keep records 
independently (Figure 8). Therefore, it is necessary to search the records of all custodians and 
compare them to make a manual judgment call concerning a reconciliation decision. Assuming 
individuals and parties are opportunistic, have different goals, and act with bounded rationality, 
searching for reconciliation is costly. Contrarily, the veracity of the data on a blockchain is 
automatically corroborated by all nodes of the network and is shared as a single truth across the 
whole network. When recording an asset, the whole blockchain network automatically 
corroborates the new entry. Consequently, record reconciliation becomes a seamless activity. 
Therefore, blockchain technology significantly attenuates searching activities vis-à-vis record 
reconciliation. 
As a second illustration, the annual costs of KYC due diligence per bank are up to 500 
million dollars (Moyano & Ross, 2017) and Guo and Liang (2016) stress the difficulties faced by 
financial institutions in meeting KYC compliance requirements. Along the same lines, our 
participants suggested that blockchain technology could significantly reduce searching costs 
related to KYC: “Blockchain technology is a fantastic way to comply with KYC. All you have to 
do is to put the data on the blockchain, and anyone can use an App to verify.” However, some of 
the participants argued that blockchain technology will change the nature of searching where 
KYC in the future “will mean who is downloading the information, what is the serial number of 
the device, to who is the device registered, and so on.” In this case, financial institutions would 
have to crawl these different pieces of information to stitch them together to get a reasonable 
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picture of the customer, arguably increasing searching costs. Some participants suggested 
blockchain technology might even shift the KYC burdens from financial institutions to 
government authorities. If this prediction transpires, it would mean increased searching costs for 
the authorities, but reduced searching costs for the institutions. It is unclear whether the KYC 
due diligence will remain with the banks or shift to the authorities; however, it is likely that the 
nature of searching for KYC information will change with blockchain technology. Further 
searching costs could be incurred due to pseudonymous behavior by some customers as we have 
explained earlier in this section. Table 10 summarizes searching transaction costs related to 
blockchain-enabled financial transactions. 
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Table 10: Searching Transaction Costs 
V.2 Bargaining 
Bargaining transaction costs are related to negotiating, contracting, determining, 
devising, and arranging the steps to be taken and the terms of exchange when conducting 
business with others (Dyer, 1997; Husted & Folger, 2004; Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). As such, 
Effect Cause 
Attenuated 
transaction 
costs 
Immutability of the blockchain records increases the fidelity of its 
information 
Blockchain technology allows users to enter their own correct expansive 
identity data elements allowing credit agencies to reduce the need to 
corroborate data from multiple sources 
Blockchain data is less abundant resulting is reducing the effect of bounded 
rationality 
With blockchain technology, searching and verifying assets are redundantly 
reliable and accessible 
Blockchain technology eliminates the need for searching to reconcile records 
Blockchain technology could significantly reduce searching costs related to 
the current KYC process 
Increased 
transaction 
costs 
Immutability of blockchain data makes it difficult to correct past records 
Users in charge of their own data may opportunistically falsify their records 
or be less transparent about them 
Users of a blockchain, especially a public one, could be pseudonymous 
Some of the data entered by the users could be encrypted 
Users of a blockchain could choose to monetize their identity and content 
data 
Blockchain is more prone to the duplications and fragmentation of users’ 
profiles when users lose their private keys 
If the nature of KYC changes by blockchain technology, financial institutions 
or authorities would have to crawl more pieces of information 
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in a blockchain-based financial transaction realm, bargaining takes place with customers 
concerning matters of access to private data and services and with partners when cooperating on 
a shared blockchain—partners could be collaborators or competitors. Accordingly, we proceed to 
cover three areas to examine the differences between bargaining costs with or without 
blockchain technology. The areas are bargaining with partners, bargaining with customers, and 
smart contract as a prominent blockchain native feature that is specially related to bargaining. 
First, we examine partnering bargaining costs. Workie and Jain (2017) suggest that 
blockchain technology is helpful where financial transactions involve multiparty in areas such as 
repurchase agreements when there are risks of settlement failure—an assessment corroborated by 
participants: “Blockchain technology brings down transaction costs for large multiparty 
transactions where many institutions and people come together such as stock exchanges and the 
DTCC.” In a blockchain realm, partners share a ledger with predefined consensus mechanism, 
agreed upon shared records, and code-based asset verification process. Consequently, the 
blockchain environment has reduced frequency, higher goal congruence, lower performance 
ambiguity, and less effect of bounded rationality. Therefore, parties sharing a blockchain enjoy 
attenuated bargaining costs of negotiation and renegotiations: A participant aver that the 
technology “supports transactions across geographical distances without a very heavyweight 
institutional arrangement.” Moreover, if the shared ledger was designed with high level of 
transparency, the result is further reduced performance ambiguity and opportunism since 
negotiations between partners are anchored on accurate records and realistic expectations. 
Arguably, the reverse holds true—a blockchain that emphasizes privacy results in higher 
performance ambiguity and opportunism. Therefore, we conclude that the higher degree of 
transparency of a blockchain, the less the transaction bargaining costs. To illustrate, we revisit 
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our ‘proof of insurance’ earlier example. The policy blockchain is a private blockchain 
“accessible by participating insurance carriers, insurance distribution firms, and brokers.” It 
uses ‘proof of authority’ as a consensus mechanism—the level of access is based on the user’s 
identity. In this case, insurance carriers require significantly less bargaining effort to be able to 
settle an accident between two of their policyholders. 
Second, we examine bargaining with customers. Inasmuch as blockchain users are able to 
control their data, additional bargaining costs between the customers and the financial 
institutions are expected so as to be able to convince customers to share their information, or 
even buy the information in the case of some customers desiring to monetize their identity 
information: “Self-sovereign identity means if it is my identity, I should be empowered to share it 
with whomever I want, whenever I want, but only limited to whomever I want.” Since we have 
concluded earlier that the ability of the users to control their information will improve the 
veracity, richness, and access to their private identity data, it is arguable that due to decreased 
uncertainty, bargaining costs between customers and financial institutions will decrease. For 
example, credit and insurance rates are easy to bargain provided accurate, rich, semi-real-time 
telemetry data based on accurate user profile data or drivers record. It is also plausible that the 
richness of private data and the flexibility to share which type of private data elements will result 
in a decreased asset specificity of the user’s identity data elements a product in itself. Therefore, 
bargaining transaction costs will decrease. 
Finally, smart contracts is a prominent native feature of blockchain technology—digitally 
drafting and automatically enforcing transactions instead of arduous human interventions (de 
Meijer, 2015; Yli-Huumo et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). A contract is “a framework that is a 
highly adjustable and almost never accurately indicative of real working relations, but a guide in 
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cases of doubt or conflict” (Llewellyn, 1931; Williamson, 2008). Williamson posits that 
contracts are never complete due to 1) environmental uncertainty owed to the unpredictability of 
future contingencies (Geyskens et al., 2006), 1) behavioral uncertainty stemming from 
performance ambiguity ex-post (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990), 3) language equivocality where the 
more detailed the contract, the more likely it contains ambiguous clauses (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1990), and 4) bounded rationality (Simon, 1955; Williamson, 1973). Compared to traditional 
contracts, when constructing a smart contract, heftier negotiation costs obtain since smart 
contracts are code-based with less room for future flexibility needed to accommodate for future 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and challenges concerning the conversion of equivocal 
language into algorisms (Simon, 1955; Williamson, 1973). Therefore, with a smart contract 
people might be more reluctant to commit to a code-based that is perceived to be a rigid contract, 
and if they do, it will take significant effort to agree to the terms and the translation of the terms 
into an algorithm. Furthermore, since a smart contract has to account for every scenario, it is 
arguable that more burdensome upfront negotiations costs obtain. Nonetheless, once a smart 
contract is deployed, no future renegotiations costs are expected, and therefore, not costs of 
renegotiations are incurred. To summarize, Table 11 illustrates the bargaining transaction costs 
as they relate to the impact of blockchain technology on asset verification, record keeping, and 
data privacy. 
  
 73 
Table 11: Bargaining Transaction Costs 
V.3 Controlling 
Control costs are ex-post transaction costs related to monitoring and enforcing 
predetermined obligations to ensure their fair fulfillment or to respond to the breach thereof by 
any party (Husted & Folger, 2004; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). In a blockchain-based financial 
transaction ecosystem, control costs comprise costs such as tracking assets, monitoring records, 
ensuring the protection of private data, enforcing AML laws, and policing the execution of 
financial contracts. 
We first explicate the reasons blockchain technology could be designed as a readily 
transparent control platform (Workie & Jain, 2017; Yli-Huumo et al., 2016), hence affecting the 
controlling costs of auditing, monitoring (Kiviat, 2015), and enforcement requirements and 
Effect Cause 
Attenuated 
transaction 
costs 
In a blockchain realm, partners share a ledger with predefined consensus 
mechanism, agreed upon shared records, and code-based asset verification 
process 
It is possible to design a blockchain with a high level of transparency 
The ability of the users to control their information improves the veracity, 
richness, and access to their private identity data, leading to a decreased 
uncertainty 
The richness of blockchain users’ private data and the flexibility to share 
which type of private data elements results in a decreased asset specificity of 
the user’s identity data elements 
Blockchain smart contracts require no future adjustments 
Increased 
transaction 
costs 
It is possible to design a blockchain with a high level of privacy 
Inasmuch as blockchain users are able to control their data, financial 
institutions need to convince customers to share their information or even 
offer to buy 
Preparing a smart contract requires heavy bargaining costs 
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practices desired by financial institutions, government authorities, and regulatory bodies. First, as 
we have explained earlier, blockchain timestamps events and records (Crosby et al., 2016). As 
such, owing to the dimension of chronology, it impacts control ling costs due to the effects on 
performance ambiguity, opportunism, and bounded rationality. Second, by design, blockchain 
transactions are immutable and tamperproof (Mougayar, 2016; Wang et al., 2016), thereby, 
affecting opportunism. Third, blockchain ledger is “centralized and fully decentralized at the 
same time,” thus, impacting goal incongruence and asset specificity. Fourth, blockchain 
technology employs code-based consensus mechanisms (DuPont & Maurer, 2015; Mori, 2016), 
and consequently, impacting controlling costs determinants of frequency, goal incongruence, and 
performance ambiguity. Finally, blockchain technology has smart contracts as a native feature 
(Auctus_Team, 2017; Mougayar, 2016), therefore, impacting the effects of frequency, 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and opportunism. Next, we cover each one of the above 
attributes in relation to financial transactions controlling costs. 
First, the impact of timestamping on transaction controlling costs could be explicated by 
a scenario where a customer initiates a transaction to buy a specific financial asset. Owing to the 
timestamp of the event and the timestamp of the value of the asset, it would be possible to cross-
verify the value of the asset at that exact timestamp, and therefore, less transaction controlling 
costs are incurred due to the reduction of opportunism—where, for example, the seller could 
opportunistically claim an asset value at a different timestamp—or bounded rationality behavior. 
Likewise, user private data is readily available to be visualized as time series, hence, reducing 
the costs of monitoring activities stemming from performance ambiguity. 
Second, by design, blockchain transactions are immutable and tamperproof. Any 
opportunistic modification of the historical data record is detectable by participating blockchain 
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network nodes (B. Lee & Lee, 2017; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). Evidence that is tamperproof 
reduces litigation transaction costs incurred by parties that are involved in a dispute. 
Furthermore, immutability leads to traceability (Mori, 2016) due to the verifiability of every 
record ever transacted on a blockchain (Crosby et al., 2016). Contrarily, in blockchains with a 
high level of privacy such as Monero, and Zcash, pseudonymous behavior by users could raise 
the costs for authorities to control illicit activates such as AML. On the other hand, blockchain 
being immutable, it is arguable that controlling costs associated with blockchain exchanges are 
less than cash exchanges since a permanent trace of activities on the ledger could be 
discouraging to criminals (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). From the regulators perspective, they are 
“used to work through the banks.” In a blockchain world, regulators might absorb the burden of 
enforcing the prohibition of activities such as money laundering. In such cases, financial 
institutions would enjoy less controlling transaction costs while the authorities would incur 
additional transaction controlling costs. 
Third, blockchain ledger is “centralized and fully decentralized at the same time.” As 
such, it has built-in redundancy leading to less transaction controlling costs attributed to the loss 
of access due to network downtime or congestion. Moreover, a blockchain ledger is a single 
source of truth (Pilkington, 2015) that is shared across the whole network. Therefore, monitoring 
costs are reduced owed to a reduced asset specificity of its data that is accessible by all 
authorized participants. However, in a blockchain environment, sharing data between partners, 
and sometimes competitors, is essential. For instance, “it does not matter how good the proof of 
insurance is if it is one-sided.” Hence, further transaction controlling is needed to monitor the 
‘proof of collaboration’ meta-records: “One of the first hurdles that we had was to be able to 
prove that these competitors could come together on these various solutions and work together.” 
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Fourth, blockchain technology employs code-based consensus mechanisms (DuPont & 
Maurer, 2015; Mori, 2016). As such, less transaction controlling is needed due to the attenuation 
of the effects of bounded rationality and language equivocality. Furthermore, the blockchain 
records are also corroborated by other full nodes in the network continuously verifying the 
validity of every new block and the overall integrity of the whole ledger. As such, the built-in 
and code-based automation reduce manual efforts to achieve the same with traditional setups. 
Moreover, if ‘monitoring’ is considered as a skill, the generality of blockchain code-based 
capability reduces the asset specificity compared to more traditional monitoring procedures. 
Similarly, the current processes of digital payments and currency transfers require heavy 
consumption of human and infrastructural assets of financial institutions that act as 
intermediaries to conduct, clear, and settle transactions (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). With a public 
blockchain, parties can exchange directly over the network, utilizing encryption and consensus 
mechanisms (Guo & Liang, 2016; Tsai et al., 2016; Zhu & Zhou, 2016) with thinner layers of 
intermediaries and less involvement of external judicial systems to monitor and enforce the 
fairness of value exchanges. To illustrate, blockchain technology can enforce ownership by 
virtue of a consensus mechanism (Workie & Jain, 2017) that is already agreed upon by all 
participants, and therefore, reducing the transaction enforcement costs. 
Fifth and lastly, we examine controlling costs for smart contracts. In the ‘Bargaining’ 
section we have examined smart contracts ex-ante bargaining costs provided environmental 
uncertainty and the difficulties vis-à-vis the translation of equivocal language to code. If we 
assume a smart contract is already appropriately coded and deployed, it is arguable that the smart 
contract would significantly attenuate the monitoring, enforcement, and litigation controlling 
transaction costs. In general, contractual disputes represent a significant share of litigations in the 
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US and the UK—44 percent and 57 percent of the cases respectively (Swan, 2015; Swanson, 
2014). Accordingly, Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) assert that smart contracts could 
disintermediation the law profession. 
The current financial transaction controlling process is slow and semi-manual. If replaced 
by blockchain technology, the ensuing elevated transparency could aid both regulators and 
participants currently struggling to conduct and monitor the intricate post-trade records and 
activities (Workie & Jain, 2017). Blockchain technology can natively, seamlessly, and more 
transparently afford robust audit trails of records of dividend disbursements, ownership details, 
stock split terms, stock transactions timestamps, taxes reports, and compliance reporting 
requirements (Rechtman, 2017). Therefore, financial institutions and regulators could build 
collaborative platforms that would reduce the transaction controlling costs required by the 
regulators from financial institutions: “It is a big arduous task for them to gather that 
information across various back office systems. If you have the information on the blockchain, 
you could very easily create a use case to do all that regulatory reporting very quickly and cut 
out many working hours required for that.”  
Finally, a blockchain could traverse multiple jurisdictions which could be “confusing 
because the beauty of decentralized networks is not having borders, although we still have 
borders and live in physical places. There are rules and taxes that we cannot just end on a 
dime.” Therefore, applying these multijurisdictional laws contributes to the transaction 
enforcement costs. For instance, the nature of privacy-related regulations “varies greatly from 
country to country, from Estonia where everything is on blockchain, to countries where they will 
take many years before doing anything.” Table 12 summarizes the financial transactions 
controlling costs.  
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Table 12: Controlling Transaction Costs 
  
Effect Cause 
Attenuated 
transaction 
costs 
Blockchain timestamps attenuate the effects of bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and performance ambiguity 
Blockchain immutability affords evidence that is tamperproof  
Blockchain immutability increases traceability and verifiability 
In a blockchain world, financial institutions might get rid of the burden of 
being required to enforce the prohibition of activities such as money 
laundering 
Blockchain has built-in redundancy 
Blockchain shared ledger has a reduced asset specificity 
Blockchain code-based consensus mechanism attenuates the effects of 
bounded rationality and language equivocality 
In a blockchain environment, monitoring records validity and network 
integrity are built-in, code-based, and less asset specific 
Blockchain technology affords thinner layers of intermediaries and less 
involvement of external judicial systems to monitor and enforce the fairness 
of value exchanges 
Smart contracts significantly attenuate the monitoring, enforcement, and 
litigation controlling 
Blockchain can natively, seamlessly, and more transparently afford robust 
audit trails of records 
Increased 
transaction 
costs 
A blockchain with a high level of privacy raises the cost for controlling illicit 
activates 
In a blockchain world, government authorities might absorb the burden of 
prohibiting things such as money laundering 
In a blockchain environment, there is a need to share data between partners, 
and sometimes competitors 
For a blockchain crossing multiple jurisdictions, there is a need to enforce all 
global laws covered 
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VI DISCUSSION 
Blockchain is an integrative meta-technology characterized by a decentralized and 
distributed single truth ledger, immutable and tamperproof data records, code-based consensus 
mechanisms, time-stamped records, peer-to-peer transmission, built-in cryptography, and native 
applications such as smart contracts (Mougayar, 2016; Wang et al., 2016). Motivated by its 
potential to reduce the costs and improve the performance of financial transactions, the 
technology has been touted as the innovation engine for the financial industry (de Meijer, 2015; 
Guo & Liang, 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). With its introduction, it is possible to verify assets, keep 
records, and protect data in a decentralized fashion with less friction and fewer loci of control 
(Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). As such, financial institutions are increasingly interested in the 
technology (de Meijer, 2016). 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation contributes to the body of knowledge concerning 
the impact of this emerging phenomenon on asset verification, record keeping, data privacy, and 
transaction costs. To achieve our goal, we have employed a pluralist methodology that develops 
and contrasts a review of the literature, an analysis of the perspectives of key industry players 
and observers, and a theoretical interpretation through the lens of transaction cost theory (Coase, 
1937; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1975). By discussing and synthesizing these different 
perspectives in the following, this dissertation offers a number of specific contributions to the 
body of knowledge related to the impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions.  
VI.1 Blockchain Technology Can Enable Asset Verification, Record Keeping, and Data 
Privacy 
Enabled by the characteristics of its ledger, network, and protocol, blockchain technology 
can facilitate asset verification and records keeping (Workie & Jain, 2017) in a manner agreed 
upon by all participants. The network has a high level of goal congruence engendered by its 
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nodes corroborating to verify the validity of new information and the overall veracity of existing 
records (Mougayar, 2016). No single custodian can exercise opportunistic control over the 
blockchain ledger at any time (Rechtman, 2017). The ledger is, therefore, a single truth that is 
redundantly distributed across the network enabling asset verification and record keeping with 
high integrity and accessibility. As such, blockchain technology eliminates the need for the 
current semi-manual processes where multiple custodians keep records in disparate databases 
and where each financial institution verifies assets on its own. Consequently, for blockchain 
participants, asset reconciliation becomes automatic since the ledger has a single shared pre-
agreed upon truth at any particular timestamp. This is of significant value because asset 
verification and record reconciliation consume much of the financial institutions’ resources: “We 
need to have the correct info to be able to pay dividends, taxes, tax rates, etc. Keeping track of 
that is very tricky. Therefore, reconciliation is very complex, and something that takes long. That 
is where blockchain technology might make a difference.” 
Data privacy and transparency are two desired outcomes, but sometimes they conflict. 
The tradeoff between privacy and transparency is a business decision concerning the balance 
between confidentiality and verifiability. A blockchain network could be designed to enable the 
desired balance between transparency and privacy (Narayanan et al., 2016; Yli-Huumo et al., 
2016). The level of data privacy and transparency depends on factors such as the agreed upon 
policy regarding the pseudonymity of the users, whether the data is stored using encryption, the 
access control scheme, and whether the blockchain network is public, private, hybrid, or 
permissioned. Moreover, blockchain users could control their “Self-sovereign identity” data 
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016) leading to the improvement of its veracity and richness, and 
therefore, reducing its asset specificity. 
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These insights were corroborated by our literature review and empirical data and were 
further supported by our theoretical analysis. 
VI.2 On Balance, Blockchain Technology Can Lower Financial Transaction Costs 
In alignment with our theoretical analysis we focus on ‘transaction theory’ costs and 
further support our argument pluralistically with our literature review and empirical data where 
transaction costs takes a broader meaning of ‘transaction theory’ costs and production costs 
(Dyer, 1997; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), in addition to transition costs. As such, we proceed to 
discern the impact of blockchain technology on searching, bargaining, and controlling costs. 
First, considering searching costs, the ability of blockchain users to enter their own 
identity data increases the integrity and richness of the ledger. Therefore, significantly reducing 
searching costs for credit reporting data. Contrarily, pseudonymity behavior, encrypting records, 
and falsifying own records increase searching costs. However, it is less significant assuming 
users’ reputational data is important to them to receive financial transaction services. 
Furthermore, blockchain searching attributes increase the fidelity of the information and 
significantly reduces searching costs. On the other hand, the need to search for multiple versions 
due to immutability could be solved technologically. Our pluralistic findings detailed KYC and 
asset reconciliation as two major exemplars where blockchain technology positively attenuates 
transaction searching costs. 
Second, related to bargaining costs, blockchain tenants share a pre-agreed upon code-
based and transparent ecosystem. This significantly reduces the negotiation and renegotiation 
costs since bargainers are anchored on correct information. We argue that blockchains with more 
focus on privacy will be less profuse since the quest for transparency drives the value proposition 
of building a blockchain network. The ‘proof of insurance’ example drawn from our empirical 
 82 
data supports this conclusion. Indeed, there is a possibility that some users might try to monetize 
their identify data, therefore increasing bargaining cost. Nevertheless, it is less likely there will 
be many such users for reasons explained above. Certainly, negotiating smart contracts could 
significantly increase bargaining costs. Nonetheless, these bargaining costs are less significant 
compared to the savings on the controlling costs. 
Third and finally, we consider controlling costs. The ability to design a blockchain as a 
readily transparent controlling platform (Workie & Jain, 2017; Yli-Huumo et al., 2016) 
significantly reduces controlling costs (Kiviat, 2015) as shown by the long list of where 
blockchain technology attenuates controlling costs—Table 12. The few areas where blockchain 
technology increases cost are of less significance based on the following argument: a) we have 
already addressed private blockchains above b) the scenario of the authorities absorbing KYC 
and AML compliance requirements is merely a matter of shifting costs away from financial 
institutions, c) the need for monitoring the sharing of data between partners could reduce over 
time as goal congruency increases, and d) enforcing all global laws covered by a blockchain 
network might be of significance, but not too different compared to traditional technologies. 
Therefore, we conclude that, on balance, blockchain technology attenuates transaction 
costs. 
VI.3 Blockchain Technology Furnishes a Reporting Platform for Financial Transactions 
The findings from our pluralistic method concur that blockchain technology could 
potentially be the platform for reporting activities for financial transactions. Owed to 
immutability and decentralization, the permanence of blockchain data (Narayanan et al., 2016) 
makes it a reliable platform to keep important records indefinitely. The events are verifiable and 
traceable due to their timestamps (Crosby et al., 2016; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Furthermore, 
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corroborated by the whole network (Rechtman, 2017), data on a blockchain ledger attains a high 
level of integrity and veracity. With its built-in cryptography, data privacy and access control are 
built-in capabilities. Besides, its native applications such as smart contracts (Mougayar, 2016; 
Wang et al., 2016) could enable process automation. As such, blockchain technology can 
natively, seamlessly, and more transparently afford robust audit trails of records of financial 
transactions (Rechtman, 2017) with minimal transaction costs. 
As a readily available reporting infrastructure (Workie & Jain, 2017), blockchain 
technology is impactful to auditing and monitoring (Kiviat, 2015) requirements and practices 
desired by financial institutions and regulatory bodies. The platform could enable financial 
institutions to exchange reports among themselves, as well as with authorities in compliance with 
regulatory requirements: “It is a big arduous task for them to gather that information across 
various back office systems. If you have the information on the blockchain, you could very easily 
create a use case to do all that regulatory reporting very quickly and cut out many working 
hours required for that.” 
VI.4 Blockchain Technology Requires Approaching Financial Transactions Differently 
Blockchain technology is greater than the sum of its parts (Mougayar, 2016). Thus, it is 
both a technological and economic innovation that offers a platform to record transactions and 
share data between participating parties in a more efficient, transparent, and verifiable manner 
(Liebenau & Elaluf-Calderwood, 2016; Lindman et al., 2017; Workie & Jain, 2017). The 
technology reshapes centricity and reshapes governance (Guo & Liang, 2016). Synthesizing the 
perspectives of our literature review, empirical data, and theoretical analysis, we found the 
following six aspects about blockchain-based financial transactions that behoove managers to 
approach financial transactions differently when considering blockchain technology. 
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First, a blockchain network is a multitenant environment. Its value proposition obtains 
when the ecosystem is a decentralized multiparty that would benefit from an engendered trust. 
To be successful, blockchain participants should do away with isolated data records and share 
information on the blockchain ledger to enhance reputability, accountability, and controllability 
(de Meijer, 2015) by computationally, efficiently, and seamlessly keeping records across the 
financial value chain (Kiviat, 2015). In this way, blockchain participants are enabled to work 
with high level of goal congruence and low level of performance ambiguity. 
Second, blockchain records alter the nature of financial transactions and their transaction 
costs since they a) attain further veracity over time (Narayanan et al., 2016), therefore, redefining 
traditional concepts such as the finality of settlements (Mori, 2016), b) are immutably 
corroborated by the whole network, c) are secure, but could raise security issues of different 
nature, d) could be made accessible to only the intended audience, and e) are chronological 
accounts of events (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). 
Third, the technology could expand the richness and reach of financial transaction 
services (de Meijer, 2015). Nonetheless, much of the gain would not be owed to the automation 
of current processes, but to the development of new business models (Mori, 2016; Workie & 
Jain, 2017). An extreme exemplar could be the emergence of DAOs—organizations with self-
governed operations and user-produced value creation and rewards (Mougayar, 2016). 
Fourth, blockchain technology enables individuals to assume controls of their privacy 
aspects (Nakamoto, 2008). Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) further posit that not only would 
blockchain technology furnish a flexible means for individuals to control and protect their data, 
but also to monetize their identities and personal information. The implications were 
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demonstrated in our empirical and theoretical analysis, and are exemplified by the potentially 
significant impact on credit reporting industry. 
Fifth, the current financial transaction regulations that have been tailored for a “financial 
ecosystem that we have developed in the past 100 to 200 years” will have to adapt to a different 
world. There might be “a need for some extra sort of blockchain sensors” to enable monitoring 
financial activities. The nature of compliance requirements such as KYC and AML could 
become different. As such, KYC and AML could be expanded to searching and monitoring a 
network of vibrant online activities. Moreover, the transaction costs of KYC and AML due 
diligence might shift from financial institutions to government authorities. 
Sixth and finally, blockchain-based startups will force incumbents to reduce transaction 
costs: “Visa and MasterCard are now a duopoly in the payment sector. If we have many other 
options then, especially internationally, they have to reduce their fees drastically to remain 
competitive.” Therefore, incumbents must invest in exploring blockchain technology since it is 
“a strategic decision to invest now while it is still developing to gain a head start.” Moreover, 
potentially, blockchain technology could introduce a massive change regarding how we would 
interact with capital markets in the form of ICOs. 
VI.5 Adoption of Blockchain Technology for Financial Transactions is Uncertain and 
Complex 
Like all newly introduced technologies, blockchain technology is far from fully charted 
waters: “It is so fascinating, and we still do not understand it. We still do not understand some of 
the negative.” Disruptive innovations usually surpass the internal absorption and usurpation 
capabilities of established institutions (Mougayar, 2016). To successfully transition to blockchain 
technology, incumbents and startups will have to resolve the technological, regulatory, adoption, 
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and transaction hurdles as we found in our literature review, empirical data, and theoretical 
analysis. 
First, blockchain technology is not yet mature, and therefore, several technological issues 
arise. Many financial systems require high throughput, thus, presenting a challenge for 
blockchain technology provided its sequential ledger, consensus mechanism, and the need for its 
nodes to operate in server-client dual mode (Tsai et al., 2016). Storage requirements are also high 
given its ever-growing ledger (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). There are also security 
risks such as the 50% attack (Narayanan et al., 2016) and “the risk of losing passwords.” 
Immutability makes it “hard to go back and modify the record because one has to get agreement 
from everyone.” Moreover, its built-in redundancy comes with the price of taxing computational 
and networking resources. Therefore, the financial industry leaders “are waiting until blockchain 
technology is mature before they spend the money.” 
Second, the regulatory framework is still evolving, therefore, adding to the uncertainty 
surrounding a relatively new technology: “The largest problem is the regulatory framework.” 
Besides, “the regulators themselves do not understand how cryptocurrencies or blockchain 
technology works.” Thus far, there are a few compliance requirements concerning asset 
verification, record keeping, and data privacy (FINRA, 2017). Furthermore, for a global 
blockchain covered by heterogeneous jurisdictions, compliance is further complicated (Mori, 
2016). 
Third and finally, there are several general adoption issues. For instance, not all 
stakeholders appreciate the value proposition of blockchain technology, but some see it as “full 
of hype and euphoria with real potential for only a few use cases.” Some believe blockchain 
technology will not deliver on all its promises. Many stakeholders, therefore, advocate gradual 
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adoption: “Rather than jump in, which could bring numerous problems I could not think of, I 
would cautiously watch the technology as it matures, then adopt it in a controlled way.” The 
decision of when to use blockchain technology versus traditional ones is complex 
(Auctus_Team, 2017) and “it is hard to be aware of all the different flavors of blockchains in an 
arms race to see who can provide better features.” Sharing a blockchain network requires 
participating parties to agree on governance and operational aspects and probably settling around 
standards that all the industry players will adopt. It requires effort to integrate the current 
multiple interconnected financial systems or replace with blockchain technology. Besides, 
although, on balance, blockchain technology attenuates transaction costs, it also increases some 
of them—Tables 10-12. 
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VII REFLECTIONS 
Based on our pluralistic methodology, we have uncovered specific areas that pertain to 
the impact of blockchain on financial transactions. In this section, we reflect on some general 
themes that have emerged through this dissertation. 
VII.1 Understanding the Complexity of Designing Blockchains 
We have detailed how complex blockchain technology is. As such, the industry needs 
guidance to simplify how to design, develop, and organize blockchain-based financial 
transaction services (Lindman et al., 2017). To assist with this goal, we emphasize the key 
dimensions of blockchains.  
Table 5 illustrates a few major categories of blockchains. However, the characteristics of 
blockchain technology allow financial institutions to conduct and operate a wide array of 
financial transaction services at any point in three-dimensional octants as shown in Figure 9. The 
figure shows the three operational axes.  
The first axis measures the degree of access control. Access refers to who can write and 
read which data on a blockchain. At the lowest end, a blockchain can be unconditionally 
accessible by every Internet user (Buterin, 2015; Pilkington, 2015). At the opposite end, access 
to an entirely private blockchain is controlled by a central locus of governance (Buterin, 2015; 
Pilkington, 2015). The second axis is the degree of privacy. Privacy refers to aspects of level of 
encryption and degree of user anonymity (Narayanan et al., 2016; Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). A 
blockchain can be designed with a high degree of privacy, a high degree of transparency, or 
anywhere in between. The third axis is concerned with the degree of decentralization. 
Decentralization refers to several things including the type of consensus mechanism used, the 
ownership and distribution of the network nodes, and who participates in coding and 
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development. Similar to the other dimensions, decentralization is not an ‘all or nothing’ 
(Narayanan et al., 2016). 
Figure 9: Dimensions of Blockchain 
 
Choosing levels of a blockchain access control, privacy, or centralization should be based 
on the suitability of the configuration to the business needs rather than on technological 
limitations. However, according to Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin, these choices are subject 
to what is called the “blockchain trilemma.” The trilemma states that between security, privacy, 
and decentralization, , one can only achieve optimal solutions in two of the three dimensions. 
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VII.2 Applying Transaction Cost to Blockchain Design 
We have analyzed blockchain transaction costs related to the activities of searching, 
bargaining, and controlling. This exercise proved useful, and there are additional opportunities to 
apply transaction cost theory to interpret the blockchain technology phenomenon. As we have 
discussed, transaction cost theory assumes a priori that markets are generally more efficient than 
hierarchies (Geyskens et al., 2006) and also defines when hierarchies perform better (Coase, 
1937). The determinants of the boundaries are frequency, asset specificity, goal incongruence, 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and opportunism (Klein et al., 1978; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; 
Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1979).  
Akin to the market versus hierarchy dichotomy, the choices of the type of access control, 
level of privacy, the degree of decentralization could be analyzed using the above transaction 
cost determinants. A typical blockchain is decentralized with multiparty sharing information on 
the ledger to enhance reputability, accountability, and controllability (de Meijer, 2015) by 
computationally, efficiently, and seamlessly keeping records across the financial value chain 
(Kiviat, 2015). However, other configurations are possible, and sometimes desirable. 
A highly accessible and decentralized blockchain is extremely immutable, and therefore, 
it is not possible to fix a mistake. In this sense, immutability affords traceability and reliability; 
nonetheless, it makes it difficult to fix mistakes and human errors. The choice of this 
configuration is arguably needed when there are high levels of opportunism and goal 
incongruence. A blockchain with high privacy could be the choice of users whose primary 
concern is opportunism. A transparent, decentralized, and accessible blockchain could the choice 
when transactions are frequent with a low level of asset specificity. 
 91 
VII.3 Appreciating the Blockchain Ecosystem 
For blockchain innovation to permeate, a surrounding and integrated ecosystem needs to 
flourish. Blockchain technology alone will not lead to a significant transformation of financial 
transactions. For instance, Mori (2016) asserts that 80 percent of the challenges in the financial 
industry are associated with business models and processes, and only 20 percent are attributable 
to technological hurdles. As such, redesigning processes and coming up with innovative business 
models are vital to the success of a blockchain technology paradigm shift. Doing so is not easy 
by any means as stated by one of the participants: “Blockchain technology opportunities are 
limited because of the way the whole asset industry is structured right now. Change is not 
happening, it would require quite a bit.” 
The ecosystem comprises a) blockchain-based new entrants to the financial transaction 
sector, b) incumbent financial services providers, c) interconnectors between different entities 
exemplified by cryptocurrency exchanges, d) technology innovators—incumbents and 
entrepreneurs—to supply the market with blockchain-based solutions, and e) regulators to 
guarantee compliance and to build the required regulatory framework. In addition, the ecosystem 
includes new types of consumers with new aspirations, passion, and demands. In this way, 
collaboration and convergent interests are essential to unleashing the power of blockchain 
technology. 
From a technology stack ecosystem point of view, we envision a future permeated by 
machine-to-machine type of transactions pushing the blockchain technology towards the internet 
of things (IoT) periphery. Besides, AI is expected to play an important role in adding analytical 
capability to blockchain technology. That is especially important for blockchain smart contracts 
to become smarter, more dynamic, and more flexible (machine learning type of AI), and more 
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integrated with big data. The integration of these three technologies could lead to unprecedented, 
innovative waves of development. 
VII.4 Creating Value with Blockchains 
 To understand the value creation options owed to blockchain technology, it is worth 
revisiting blockchain as a meta-technology that integrates several technologies to form a gestalt 
(Kiviat, 2015; Mougayar, 2016)—see Figure 10 which illustrates the main characteristics of 
blockchains that we have covered in this dissertation. 
Figure 10: Blockchain Gestalt  
The original promise of blockchain technology introduced by Nakamoto (2008) was to 
bypass middleman actors and allowing direct peer-to-peer transactions, a vision celebrated by 
anarchists and alarming to institutionalists. Ten years passed since, and the technology adoption 
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is shaping in a way that is rather different. Instead of disintermediating, we see the 
reintermediation of trust away from the center (Mougayar, 2016) and the formation of ‘multi-
center, weakly intermediated’ schemes (Guo & Liang, 2016) exemplified by cryptocurrency 
exchanges and blockchain-based escrow services. Many businesses were established to enable 
financial transactions and to exchange value. As such, blockchain technology permits the 
displacement of older and thicker layers of intermediation with newer and thinner ones. In doing 
so, the technology surpasses equivalence in terms of speed of financial transactions and their 
cost, level of trust, degree of flexibility, and broadening business models (de Meijer, 2015; Guo 
& Liang, 2016; Kiviat, 2015)—not only from a business side, but also from consumer and 
regulator sides.  
VII.5 Considering Blockchain Applications 
Blockchain applications can be categorized in many ways as we have seen in Appendix 
B, and Appendix D. We have uncovered three broad areas that are being actively pursued by 
financial transactions providers.  
The first area of applications is payments. Blockchain technology can reduce the cost of 
cross-border transactions, lower annual operational costs, and reduce annual cost of risk (Guo & 
Liang, 2016). Besides, the phenomenon of cryptocurrency in itself is destined for more adoption 
as exemplified by some countries augmenting their fiat currencies by cryptocurrency. The 
payment sector gave rise to new models of financial transaction services such as cryptocurrency 
exchanges, digital asset escrow service providers, and different type of cryptocurrency minters. 
The exchanges allow end users to swap cryptocurrencies with each other or with fiat currency. 
The concern of cryptocurrency being used for illicit activities is countered by blockchain 
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traceability and the concept of pseudonymity (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). In this context, 
pseudonymity could be considered as a balance between privacy and transparency. 
Second, immutability and timestamps of blockchain data make the technology suitable 
for tracking assets and activities with an elevated level of trust in the veracity of assets 
information (Crosby et al., 2016; Mori, 2016; Rechtman, 2017). As such, blockchain technology 
affords a suitable platform for asset reconciliation (Rechtman, 2017). It is also a suitable system 
to achieve compliance auditing services required by regulators (Kiviat, 2015; Workie & Jain, 
2017). Moreover, supply chain financial transactions are another major field for blockchain 
technology as exemplified by IBM Hyperledger. 
The third area is identity management. The capabilities of blockchain in managing 
identity are exemplified by its implementation in the country of Georgia. Moreover, the 
technology allows “self- sovereign identity” where users have more control over their identity 
and their content. Blockchain technology can challenge some of the established identity privacy 
norms where individual and the collective—instead of central entities—are in control of 
reputational information. 
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VIII CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Asset verification, record keeping, data privacy, and transaction costs are but some few 
areas of the financial transaction domain. Moreover, our theoretical framework is but one of 
many lenses to explore the impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions. Future 
research should, therefore, examine different theoretical frameworks and additional financial 
transaction areas to shed more light on the phenomenon. 
Although we have utilized transaction cost theory, we have focused on the impact on 
searching, bargaining, and controlling costs. However, we have left out a central transaction cost 
theory goal concerning organizational boundaries around the decision of ‘make, buy, or ally’ 
(Coase, 1937; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1979). As such, future research should consider 
extending this dissertation to examine the governance aspect. 
Compared to our theoretical analysis where we solely focused on ‘transaction theory’ 
costs, while collecting and synthesizing the literature and the empirical data, we broadly 
examined various aspects of blockchain technology impact on financial transactions. Moreover, 
in this case, the term ‘transaction cost’ took a broader meaning to engulf ‘transaction theory’ 
costs and production costs (Dyer, 1997; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), in addition to transition costs—
blockchain technology enablement costs. As such, future research should look deeper into these 
broader areas of costs related to transitioning to and operating blockchain-enabled financial 
transactions. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Pluralist Methodology 
Mingers and Brocklesby (1997) define a methodology as a structured set of guidelines or 
activities to undertake a study. They further posit that a methodology will develop implicitly or 
explicitly within a particular paradigm embodying its philosophical assumptions in terms of 
ontology—the types and nature of entities—epistemology—the possibilities of, and limitations 
on, our knowledge—and praxeology—the nature of our actions. For further details about the 
characteristics of the main paradigm families the reader may refer to Appendix F.  
 This dissertation employs a pluralist approach, where all situations are viewed as 
inherently complex and multidimensional, therefore, would benefit from multimethodology 
(Mingers, 2001). The real-world is ontologically stratified and differentiated (Bhaskar, 1994), 
and therefore, pluralism is essential to portray the richness and multidimensionality of the real 
world. Mingers (2001) avers that research methods are instruments for provoking a response 
from a complex multidimensional world, and in this respect, different methods may produce 
useful information about various aspects of the world. Hence, to construct a rich view of a 
phenomenon, it is both desirable and feasible to use pluralist methodology to gain richer and 
more reliable representation of reality. From an engaged scholarship standpoint, pluralist 
methodology is sensible because practitioners are already ahead of academia in combining 
methodologies in practice (Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997). 
Furthermore, Mingers and Brocklesby (1997) advocate that a study comprises several 
phases where each phase has different tasks and requirements, and therefore, could be embarked 
upon more effectively with a different methodology or a diversity of methodologies. 
Additionally, Mingers and Brocklesby (1997) align with the view of postmodernists where 
 97 
methods or parts of methods may be removed from their theoretical and philosophical base and 
pressed into the service of different, even competing, logics. 
To the common argument that research methods are bound to particular paradigms that 
are incommensurable, Mingers (2001) reiterates that the world is almost certainly more complex 
than we could ever know, therefore, this argument is an epistemic fallacy—limiting what may 
exist to our current knowledge—and an anthropic fallacy—defining existence as centered around 
human being (Bhaskar, 1978). Hence, it is both ontologically desirable and possible to approach 
a phenomenon pluralistically. Mingers (2001) goes further to affirm the feasibility of detaching 
research methods from a paradigm and using them within a context that proposes different 
assumptions. 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) list additional benefits of pluralist methodology. First, 
triangulation allows the researcher to validate data and results by blending a range of data 
sources, methods, or observers. Second, pluralist methodology aids creativity through the 
discovery of fresh or paradoxical factors that stimulate further research. Finally, pluralist 
methodology permits the expansion of the scope of the research to draw broader conclusions 
from situations (Mingers, 2001). 
Triangulating multiple perspectives or methods on a complex business problem or 
challenge attenuates the likelihood of unintended bias in interpretations (Van de Ven, 2007). 
Furthermore, a pluralist methodology that compares and contrasts multiple plausible models of 
reality is crucial to the emergence of rigorous scientific knowledge (Azevedo, 1997; Van de Ven, 
2007). Most importantly, a pluralist methodology can help to study a business phenomenon that 
is emerging and not well researched, by providing complementary types of insights. The essence 
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of pluralist methodology is to combine perspectives and parts of methodologies (Mingers & 
Brocklesby, 1997). 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation iteratively traverses multiple perspectives by 
drawing on three methods. First, is exploring the literature on blockchain technology as it relates 
to the financial industry. The second method of this research is a number of interviews on 
blockchain technology with financial sector executives, subject matter experts, and academics to 
enhance the understanding of a complex phenomenon by engaging the perspectives of diverse 
scholars and stakeholders (Bechara & Van de Ven, 2007). Third, transaction cost theory (Coase, 
1937; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1975) as a particularly stimulating theoretical framework that 
promises insights into the potentially disruptive effects of the blockchain technology. This 
dissertation will employ an iterative juxtaposing and analysis of these three perspectives and 
methods While collecting and synthesizing the literature and the empirical data, we broadly 
examined various aspects of blockchain technology impacts on financial transactions. Moreover, 
in this case, the term ‘transaction cost’ took a broader meaning to engulf ‘transaction theory’ 
costs and production costs (Dyer, 1997; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), in addition to transition costs—
blockchain technology enablement costs. However, during the theoretical analysis, we zoomed in 
to solely focus on ‘transaction theory’ costs. 
Underlying this qualitative dissertation, the researcher espouses, at the paradigm level, a 
critical realist stance that adopts a combination of an objective ontology and a subjective 
epistemology (Bechara & Van de Ven, 2007). This paradigm sits well with the context of the 
inquiry at hand as well as with the pluralist methodology because of five major assumptions 
made by Bechara and Van de Ven (2007). First there is a real world; however, we are limited in 
our ability to understand it. Second, all facts and data are theory-laden. Third, even though some 
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methods are better than others in a given context, no form of inquiry can be value-free and 
unbiased. Fourth, triangulation produces more rigorous knowledge. Finally, the fit of a 
methodology is context specific. 
Appendix A.1: The Literature Review Method 
The first side of the triangular pluralistic methodology is the literature review. The 
literature review situates the research contextually and builds on prior research (Myers, 2013). 
The literature review is the foundation (Webster & Watson, 2002) that forms the empirical basis 
for conducting the research (Trochim, Donnelly, & Arora, 2015). A major purpose of the 
literature review is to recognize what is covered by the extant literature and to validate the 
originality of the intended contribution as inspired by the research question. 
According to Webster and Watson (2002), two forms of literature reviews exist. First, 
when treating a mature subject matter that is well covered by the extant literature. Second, when 
exploring an emerging topic that has a dearth of coverage by the extant research. Inasmuch as 
blockchain technology is emerging, the approach of research adopted here aligns with the second 
from where it is beneficial to augment with potential theoretical foundations (Webster & Watson, 
2002) as explicated by the subsequent theoretical interpretation section. Moreover, the 
triangulation with the perception analysis method helps in tightening the inherent looseness in 
extant body of knowledge of such an emerging field as in the case of the topic of this 
dissertation. 
Based on the research question concerning the impact of blockchain technology on 
financial transactions, the first step taken was to identify the intersection of the literature streams 
comprising the overlap of blockchain technology with the financial industry. Although a few 
technological articles were covered, the focus was on the business-related literature streams. To 
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fully comprehend the underlying business aspects and technological schemes of blockchain 
technology, the researcher took notes from attending a virtual class offered by Princeton 
University (Princeton University, 2014) as well as reading five books on the topic. The effort 
was followed by a systematic literature review—a relatively broad survey of relevant literature 
that is considered complete when no new concepts emerge in the article set (Trochim et al., 
2015). Accordingly, a systematic review of related literature began by searching for articles 
covering the intersection of literature on blockchain technology and the intersection with the 
financial industry. The search of the extant literature yielded four hundred and twenty related 
articles. 
The next step was to examine the summaries of the articles mentioned above with two 
goals in mind. The first goal was to identify which articles are strongly related to this dissertation 
subject matter. The second goal was to group the concepts into subcategories. Following this 
winnowing effort, the articles were read, and related passages were identified. Furthermore, 
additional related articles—referenced in the set—were discovered. Next, the supplementary 
articles were read, and related passages were identified. The overall effort resulted in a) fifty-
seven articles of general nature detailing blockchain-related business and technological aspects; 
b) forty-three articles concerning the intersection of blockchain technology with the financial 
industry—inclusive of current and potential future blockchain-based financial applications; c) 
thirty articles covering various non-financial applications of blockchain technology; and d) seven 
articles related to legal and legislative areas of blockchain technology. In addition to the five 
books mentioned earlier, the literature set comprised academic papers, white papers, industry 
blogs, and videos. The deviation from the reliance on only academic articles is due to the 
newness and emergence of the blockchain technology phenomenon. 
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Next, a systematic data analysis of the passages was conducted to identify and categorize 
text passages in relation to the corresponding ‘literature review’ sections in the manuscript. Open 
coding was employed to identify passages in the texts that describe relevant phenomena (Myers, 
2013). Later, axial coding was utilized to conceptualize and group the passages into categories in 
order to triangulate with the perception analysis data. Axial coding specifies each category’s 
properties and dimensions (Charmaz, 2014). Finally, selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) 
was employed to selects core categories and relate them to corresponding concepts from 
transaction cost theory—the theoretical framework. 
In addition, the literature review supports the systematic compilation and synthesis of all 
of the extant literature related to a research subject matter (Trochim et al., 2015) and concisely 
explicates what has been learned (Webster & Watson, 2002). Accordingly, to enable the 
synthesis of uncovered concepts, the literature review was organized into three chapters: 1) 
Introduction, 2) Technology: Blockchains, and 3) Application: Financial Transactions. 
Appendix A.2: The Perception Analysis Method 
The second pillar of the triangular pluralist mythology is the perception analysis. 
Interviews are like night vision goggles that permit the researcher a vivid view of the scattered 
objects in the field (Myers, 2013; Rubin & Rubin, 2011). The inclusion of the perception 
analysis of blockchain technology practitioners, experts, and researchers increases the rigor of 
the research because it fills the contextual gaps typically present in the extant literature 
concerning emerging fields such as the one being examined by this dissertation. Furthermore, a 
significant benefit for augmenting the literature review method with the perception data is to 
bridge the temporal lag where there is two to three-year between conducting studies and their 
publication in academic journals (Myers, 2013). Additionally, the perception analysis serves to 
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validate insights from the theoretical interpretation method. Finally, interviews are primary 
data—collected by the researcher—that adds richness and credibility to qualitative research 
(Myers, 2013).  
The first step was to decide on how many people to interview in order to gain their 
perception. Inasmuch as this is a qualitative research, sample size has no significance. A more 
critical concern than the number of interviews is to make sure that the pool of participants 
embodies a variety of voices (Myers, 2013; Myers & Newman, 2007). As such, we believed that 
sixteen participants provided enough variety of voices. Our confidence level in reaching rigorous 
conclusions is further elevated by virtue of triangulating the data from the interviews with both 
the literature review and the theoretical perspective. To further ensure diversity of views, target 
participants were selected as follows: a) six financial industry blockchain technology executives, 
b) five senior blockchain technology subject matter experts, and c) five blockchain researchers. 
A semi-structured interview was devised with prepared questions; however, at times, we 
deviated from the script and improvised new questions depending on the conversation (Myers, 
2013). The reader may refer to Appendix I for details regarding structure of the interviews. 
According to Myers (2013), semi-structured interviews enable the interviewees to provide more 
rich insights and to offer valuable information. Contrasted with structured interviews where the 
researcher sticks to prepared questions, and unstructured interviews where no prepared questions 
are preformulated, semi-structured interviews allow flexibility while sustaining a reasonable 
level of focus. As such, each participant was separately interviewed once for a duration of sixty 
minutes by telephone. The researcher took notes during each interview. Additionally, each 
interview was recorded digitally and transcribed later. 
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Next, we engaged in systematic data analysis of the interview transcripts. First, open 
coding was applied to uncover relevant concepts (Myers, 2013). 286 passages were captured. 
The second step was to use axial coding to conceptualize and group the passages into higher-
level concepts (Charmaz, 2014) resulting into 9 distinct codes. Third and finally, selective coding 
was employed to select core categories and relate them to other categories (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990) being our four arear areas of financial transaction in the case: asset verification, record 
keeping, data privacy, and transaction costs. The perception analysis was iteratively juxtaposed 
to the data generated with the literature review method. Moreover, data from both the interviews 
and the literature review was iteratively related to the insights from the theoretical interpretation 
method as will be explicated in the next section. 
During all phases of the interview process precautionary measures were taken to protect 
the privacy of the participants’ personal information and their organizational data. The tools used 
for conducting the interviews are listed in Appendices F, G, and H. 
On the one hand, the goal of practical knowledge is concerned with situations in a 
particular case. On the other hand, the purpose of scientific knowledge is to seek a generalization 
that can be used to explain and understand things (Van de Ven, 2007). As such, the perception 
analysis method covers the former, while the next method covers the latter. 
Appendix A.3: The Theoretical Interpretations Method 
The third and final leg of the pluralistic methodology is the theoretical interpretation. 
Theoretical frameworks provide abstract, conceptual understandings of the phenomenon under 
investigation (Charmaz, 2014). The approach adopted by the pluralistic methodology of this 
dissertation aligns with the way Yin (2013) advocates triangulating multiple sources of empirical 
data with theoretical schemes (Myers, 2013). As such, this dissertation embarked upon 
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iteratively triangulating transaction cost theory concepts, as a theoretical framework, with the 
literature review and the interviews data. The endeavor provided more profound insights 
supported by: a) practical knowledge that aided the understanding of a particular practical 
situation and b) theoretical knowledge that helped in describing the fundamental nature of things 
(Van de Ven, 2007). 
This dissertation started by applying the literature review method as detailed in the 
‘Literature Review Method’ section. Next, the perception analysis method was applied as 
explained in the ‘Perception Analysis Method’ section. Lastly, transaction cost theory was 
invoked to understand and explain findings from the two preceding methods. This sequential 
approach aligns with Lawrence (1992) who advocates problem-oriented approaches rather than 
theory-oriented approaches (Van de Ven, 2007). Lawrence suggests to start by surveying the 
field to inspect the problem and make an initial assessment of significant parameters; and then 
explore relevant theory for promising conceptualizations (Van de Ven, 2007). Furthermore, this 
dissertation summoned transaction cost theory in a fashion aligned with the view of Locke and 
Latham (2004) who aver that extant frameworks are likely inspirational resource for making 
sense of data since theory can be used to open up new possibilities (Van de Ven, 2007). As such, 
the intended approach of this dissertation of exposing the tension between data and concepts of 
transaction cost theory led to an interaction of observations that refined research foci and 
generated possibilities to uncover new interpretations that, at times, conflicted with prevailing 
views or advanced different perspectives (Van de Ven, 2007). 
Drawing on the literature review and the perception analysis, we obtained perspicacity to 
identify transaction cost theory concepts with potential explanatory power of interpreting the 
blockchain technology phenomenon in the financial industry. To achieve that, we thoroughly 
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studied research papers detailing the fundamentals of transaction cost theory as exemplified by 
(Coase, 1937, 2013; Commons, 1931, 1932; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1973, 1975, 1979, 1985, 
1988, 1994, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2014). Next, to acquire expertise with the analytical utility of 
transaction cost theory concepts, we read studies that engage transaction cost theory as a 
framework for analyzing different phenomena as exemplified by (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; 
Cheung, 1969; Pollak, 1985). 
Transaction cost theory is interdisciplinary as it joins economics with aspects of 
organization theory and contract law (Williamson, 1979). The kernel question of transaction cost 
theory is concerned with organizational boundaries around the decision of ‘make, buy, or ally;’ 
in other words, whether a transaction is more efficiently performed within a firm—vertical 
integration—or outside the firm—market governance—(Coase, 1937; Geyskens et al., 2006). As 
such, the goal of minimizing transaction costs determines the governance mechanisms (Husted & 
Folger, 2004). Transaction costs consist of searching, bargaining, monitoring, enforcement, and 
other costs that are not directly related to the production of goods or services (Husted & Folger, 
2004). Accordingly, the industry perception data and the literature review data were analyzed to 
examine impact of blockchain technology on transaction costs. The transaction costs approach 
allows identifying the circumstances—comprising goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity in Ouchi’s view—which produce the costs of mediating exchanges between 
participants (Ouchi, 1980). In Williamson’s views, transaction costs are determined by: a) 
frequency, meaning how often a contract is invoked (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 
1979), b) asset specificity, referring to whether the asset could be deployed to a different purpose 
(Husted & Folger, 2004; Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979), and therefore, raising the concern 
of goal incongruence (Ouchi, 1980) which is defined as the degree to which parties to an 
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exchange have incompatible objectives (Husted & Folger, 2004), c) uncertainty, comprising ex 
ante difficulties of anticipating all future scenarios, language equivocality (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992; Williamson, 1975), and ex post performance ambiguity concerning the difficulty of 
measuring performance, (Ouchi, 1980) or in other words, the metering problem related to the 
intricacy of assessing the level of contribution of each individual or entity to a joint effort 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Husted & Folger, 2004; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), d) bounded 
rationality, positing that people have limited ability to store, process, and retrieve information 
(Simon, 1955; Williamson, 1973), and e) opportunism, exemplified by dodging duties, breaching 
agreements, and stealing (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Husted & Folger, 2004; Williamson, 1979). 
Accordingly, we examine the aforementioned transaction costs determinants to contrast 
traditional technologies with blockchain technology. Therefore, we stress the differentiating 
characteristics of blockchain technology. First, blockchain timestamps events and records 
(Crosby et al., 2016). Second, by design, blockchain transactions are immutable and tamperproof 
(Mougayar, 2016; Wang et al., 2016). Third, blockchain ledger is “centralized and fully 
decentralized at the same time.” Fourth, blockchain employs code-based consensus mechanisms 
(DuPont & Maurer, 2015; Mori, 2016). Fifth and finally, blockchain has smart contracts as a 
native feature (Auctus_Team, 2017; Mougayar, 2016)—digitally drafting and automatically 
enforcing transactions instead of burdensome human interventions (de Meijer, 2015; Yli-Huumo 
et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). 
Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) provided a general transaction cost analysis of blockchain 
technology independent of industry. We build on and extend their work by presenting a 
transaction cost analysis specific to financial transactions. Specifically, we explore the 
transaction cost theory activities comprising searching, bargaining, and controlling (monitoring 
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and enforcement) (Hennart, 1993; Husted & Folger, 2004; Williamson, 1985) to shed light on 
how the adoption of blockchain technology will affect the transaction costs related to asset 
verification, record keeping and data privacy. We also go beyond the analysis of Tapscott and 
Tapscott (2016) by examining not only where blockchain technology attenuates transaction cost 
but also where it increases transaction cost. Finally, to objectively compare transaction costs 
between traditional technologies and blockchain technology, we assume that the blockchain 
network is already up and running. The assumption allows us to avoid the complications in 
comparing sunk costs that are related to established technologies with enablement costs that are 
related to deploying blockchain technology. 
In this way, this dissertation sought to employ transaction cost theory to make sense of 
blockchain technology phenomenon in the financial industry. The approach is analogous to past 
analysis conducted by researchers such as the study by Cheung (1969) that utilizes the 
transaction cost theory concepts of uncertainty and contracts to examine contractual records in 
Chinese agricultural communities. Another example is the analysis of entry mode decision into 
international markets through the lens of transaction cost theory by Anderson and Gatignon 
(1986). A final and third example is the work of Pollak (1985) who examines the economic 
activity and behavior of the family through the lens of transaction cost theory. 
In summary, the employment of transaction cost theory enriched the insights of the 
findings because according to Van de Ven (2007) scientific inquiry involves a repetitive contrast 
between theoretical ideas and empirical data that aids in making sense of the observations. 
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Appendix B: General Blockchain Applications 
Blockchain technology use beyond cryptocurrency is being tried in many industries 
where some forms of exchange is conducted (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). Zhao et al. (2016) posit 
that the evolution of blockchain technology runs through blockchain 1.0 with a focus on digital 
currency, then blockchain 2.0 concerning digital finance, to blockchain 3.0 encompassing a 
digital society. Zhao et al. discern that despite the burgeoning of many experimental projects, 
blockchain 2.0 and 3.0 will need many years to flourish and bring about significant economic 
impacts. Mougayar (2016) concurs and anticipates blockchain technology adoption and 
evolution to parallel the Web’s, which formed initially over seven years after the launch of the 
Internet in 1983, but then required additional efforts over three years (1994-1997) for most 
business to understand its potential. Therefore, Mougayar expects that blockchain technology 
will persist as a semi-complex phenomenon for the period 2015–2018, analogous to how it took 
Bitcoin three years (2009–2012) before it started to permeate into the main fabric of the 
economy. 
To establish a reference for understanding current and potential blockchain-based 
offerings, this dissertation will invoke the utilitarian framework of Mougayar (2016) which lists 
blockchain technology touch-points as programmable assets, programmable trust, programmable 
ownership, programmable money, programmable identity, and programmable contracts. Swan 
(2015) provides other classifications for applications —see Appendix D. The details of each of 
Mougayar’s six concepts will follow. Because blockchain technology applications may overlap 
with more than one touch-point, the examples offered under each are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Furthermore, because the concepts of programable assets and programable ownership 
are intricately conjoined, they will be combined in a single section. 
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Appendix B.1: Programmable Assets and Programmable Ownership 
According to Swan (2015), blockchain technology allows registry, inventory, and 
exchange of hard assets such as houses and computers; intangible assets such as shares, 
reservations, and health data; and copyrights such as music albums, audible books, and digitized 
fine art. The exchange of assets is possible because blockchain immutably stores information 
about every transaction and ensures its legitimacy (Pilkington, 2015). In other words, the 
blockchain time-stamps documents signifying rights or ownership, therefore providing 
indisputable certifications that are cryptographically secure and enabling seamless verification 
capabilities (Mougayar, 2016) (Swan, 2015). As such, in a blockchain database, anything can be 
treated as a ‘smart property’ (Swan, 2015). Smart property is the notion of assigning a unique 
identifier such that an asset can be traced, administered, and exchanged (Swan, 2015). Mougayar 
(2016) considers smart property a native unit requirement for blockchain operations defined as a 
digitized version of an item that includes specific rights to use and typically has a value 
associated with it. Elaborating further, Mougayar states that smart property extends the concept 
of a digital asset by associating it to a blockchain such that it can never be double-spent, double-
owned, or double-sent. As such, a smart property is "an asset or thing that knows who owns it" 
and, as such, it enables more possibilities, flexibility, and discoverability to facilitate frictionless 
decentralized peer-to-peer exchanges (Mougayar, 2016). However, that does not imply that 
related contracts concerning the exchanges are not subject to existing laws (Swan, 2015).  
In this way, smart property enables things like domain name systems (DNS) as embodied 
by Namecoin—an open-source organization that seeks to heighten decentralization, security, 
censorship resistance, privacy, and speed of certain apparatuses of the Internet exemplified by 
DNS (Namecoin, n.d.)—and digital content distribution and anti-counterfeit—enabled by the 
immutability attribute which prevents double-spending, double-owning, or double-sending 
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(Mougayar, 2016; Wang et al., 2016). Another example listed by Swan (2015) is a pre-
established smart contract that would automatically transfer a title deed of an automobile from 
the financing firm to the individual owner upon receiving the final payment. In this sense, 
blockchain becomes a single source of truth (Pilkington, 2015) for the latest status of ownership 
of assets. The absence of central human intervention to enforce verifiability is a fundamental 
blockchain technology novelty (Swan, 2015). 
Blockchain technology enables irrefutable proofs that are cryptographically secure 
through the time-stamping of documents representing rights or ownership (Mougayar, 2016). As 
such, blockchain technology allows exact ownership and chain of custody to be ascertained (de 
Meijer, 2015). Consequently, for the legal sector, this facilitates efficient digital asset exchange 
concerning document and authorship verification, title transfers, and contract enforcement 
(Kiviat, 2015). Two of the established blockchain-based enterprises are Viacoin (VIAcoin, n.d.) 
which offers notarizing services through the timestamping, transfer, and verification of 
ownership of documents (Kiviat, 2015); and Libra (Libra, n.d.) which supplies business 
customers with reports, audits, and digital asset transactions analysis in any blockchain database 
(Pilkington, 2015). 
Blockchain technology could furnish a transactional platform for sharing economy 
services (Mainelli & Smith, 2015), as it naturally allows trusted documentation of large-scale 
peer-to-peer activities (Lindman et al., 2017). Contrary to the misconception of considering 
Airbnb, Uber, and the like as sharing economy, these businesses do not share but rather 
aggregate, and in the process, they collect data for commercial exploitation (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2016). Moreover, Uber and Airbnb exemplify oligopolistic intermediaries according to 
Mougayar (2016). Swan (2015) expects the emergence of decentralized models of Airbnb—for 
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lodging, Getaround—for vehicles rentals, and LaZooz—for peer-based ride sharing. Backfeed is 
a leader in the sharing economy space. On its homepage, Backfeed mission statement is to 
develop a distributed governance system for blockchain-based applications that allows 
collaborative creation and distribution of value in spontaneously emerging networks of peers 
(Backfeed, n.d.). Toyota Research Institute has a vision to use blockchain technology to allow 
car owners to monetize seats, trunk space and other unused resources (Coindesk, 2017g). Vitalik 
Buterin, founder of the Ethereum blockchain said: “Whereas most technologies tend to automate 
workers on the periphery doing menial tasks, blockchains automate away the center. Instead of 
putting the taxi driver out of a job, blockchain puts Uber out of a job and lets the taxi drivers 
work with the customer directly” (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). 
Appendix B.2: Programmable Trust 
Joichi Ito, Director, MIT Media Lab said: “Blockchain is to trust as the Internet is to 
information" (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Blockchain technology embeds trust as an intrinsic 
attribute of transactions by implanting rules that represent trust, making blockchain a platform 
for validating transactions via logic in the network, not via a protected database entry or central 
authority (Mougayar, 2016). Swan (2015) describes blockchain as trustless in the sense that users 
do not need to trust each other or a central intermediary, but only need to trust the system. She 
further explicates that the blockchains immutability, transparency, access, and reach enable 
global trust. 
From executive stock exercises to online lottery to patenting—through time binding 
commitments with proof of knowledge—the blockchain trust fabric can transform any form of 
transaction. Democratic system could be strengthened by blockchain because the technology can 
elevate the level of trust in voting (de Meijer, 2015; Lindman et al., 2017) where transparency 
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(Zhao et al., 2016) and immutability attributes are the primary blockchain technology enablers. 
The technology could also be used for the creation of smart property where blockchain becomes 
an inventory, tracking, and an exchange mechanism for hard assets like diamonds, and for 
tracing the authenticity and origin of goods for socially responsible consumers and businesses 
(Lindman et al., 2017). 
Blockchain technology can transform trust in supply chain management by exacting 
provenance (Kim & Laskowski, 2016; Zhao et al., 2016) because it furnishes a shared, 
consensus-based public ledger that can track the process from source to destination (Crosby et 
al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2016). According to Arvind Krishna, the director of research at IBM 
(Coindesk, 2017b), the technology could save billions of dollars spent in coordination costs in 
both capital markets and the shipping industry; a typical shipment gets scrutinized by about thirty 
administrations before reaching its final destination; blockchain technology is ideal to aggregate 
and transmit the certifications required during the process, and therefore could save 20 percent of 
the cost. 
There has always been tension between transparency and privacy. Transparency enhances 
the collective trust—increased transparency provides increased levels of trust (Mougayar, 2016). 
Nevertheless, at users’ level, trust is also concerned with privacy. In a public blockchain 
network, selective transparency and privacy are achieved via cryptographic technologies, where 
transactions can be verified without revealing all aspects of the identity of their user (Mougayar, 
2016). 
Another application of the trust feature in blockchain technology is prediction markets, 
where the platform could furnish a system for increased trust and confidence in the outcome of 
the process. For example, Predictious—enabling crowd predictions from the presidential 
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elections to the Oscars (Predictious, n.d.)—and Fairlay—enables users to bet on sport events like 
horse races and popular events like elections (Fairlay, n.d.)—offer betting venues for the typical 
real-world outcomes (Swan, 2015). A distinct flavor of trust-based blockchain technology 
applications is distributed cloud storage—exemplified by Storj (Storj, n.d.) which allows users to 
store data securely, economically, and privately without a centralized authority (Kiviat, 2015; 
Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Storj uses peer-to-peer protocols to provide secure, and private 
cloud storage (Swan, 2015) that enables users to monetize their extra space in a manner that 
provides more trust and privacy, compared to regular clouds, because the data is encrypted and 
fragmented. Mougayar (2016) affirms that blockchain networks do not replace cloud computing, 
but rather unbundle and democratize parts of it. 
Blockchain technology enables new business models and resolves the trust issue more 
efficiently via code-based networks (Zhao et al., 2016). A distinct and foundational blockchain 
technology application is an emerging business model called distributed autonomous 
organization—organizations with self-governed operations and user-produced value creation and 
rewards (Mougayar, 2016). The distributed autonomous organization is a transformational 
concept that could radically alter the architecture of trust, and subsequently, the structure of 
businesses. 
Appendix B.3: Programable Identity 
Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) posit that blockchain technology will allow ‘the virtual 
you—your avatar’ be owned by you, hence, empowering you to reveal only what you needed to, 
depending on the situation, while whisking up your data crumbs when navigating the digital 
sphere. Moreover, the blockchain technology concept of zero-knowledge—ability to proof 
something without revealing information—protects the confidentiality of transactions and the 
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privacy of individuals where one can prove something without revealing any information about 
one’s identity or the content of the transaction (Narayanan et al., 2016). 
According to a Coindesk (2017c) article, about 2.4 billion individuals do not have a 
government-issued identity?, and for those who do, the current centralized systems that manage 
those identities are cumbersome at best. The article goes on to suggest that blockchain 
technology could aggregate fragmented identities and reputation systems that are spread out 
across numerous forms such as passports and birth certificates; and platforms like LinkedIn and 
Uber. Drummond Reed, chief trust officer of Evernym—a company building an identity network 
on a permissioned blockchain—argued that fear about privacy is unjustified, stating: "You do not 
put private data on the chain. You put public data on the chain" (Coindesk, 2017c). Put in a 
slightly different way, in a blockchain database, one can reveal their public elements of identity, 
while securely encrypt their private elements. Identity and reputation go together hand in hand. 
Identify reputation in the physical world is local according to Tapscott and Tapscott (2016)—
shopkeepers, employers, friends—however, in the blockchain digital economy, reputations is 
globally portable, allowing a resident of Africa to establish the reputation required to borrow 
money from America. Ultimately, the technology enables an open, democratic, and scalable 
digital economy (Wang et al., 2016). 
Appendix B.4: Programable Contracts 
Smart contracts are contracts that are digitally drafted and automatically enforced with 
the goal of attenuating human interventions (de Meijer, 2015; Yli-Huumo et al., 2016; Zhao et 
al., 2016), and hence, reduce transaction costs. Smart contracts are potentially a groundbreaking 
application of blockchain technology. Mougayar (2016) argues that smart contracts are a vital 
underpinning of blockchain technology and their role in blockchain technology is analogous to 
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how HTML allowed information to be openly publishable and linkable on the Web. The 
possibilities for programmable contracts were implanted into the blockchain protocol at its 
contrivance (Swan, 2015). Smart contracts potentially could substitute some of the functions 
currently executed by expensive and slow legacy intermediaries (Mougayar, 2016). 
There are three elements of smart contracts that make them distinct: 1) autonomy— 
ensuing its launch the code acts on its own, 2) self-sufficiency—ability to direct resources on its 
own, and 3) decentralization—distributed over multiple servers where a smart contract is self-
executing across the network (De Filippi, 2014; Swan, 2015). Therefore, a smart contract 
embodies ‘code is law’ because it will execute ‘no matter what’ in a fashion that could introduce 
a new paradigm that requires hefty absorption by the society for smart contracts to become 
common (Swan, 2015). However, Lindman et al. (2017) contend that the standing of smart 
contracts will upsurge by virtue of the broader adoption of the Internet of things. 
A traditional contract is a promise between two or more parties to exchange commitments 
(Swan, 2015). She further posits that while trust plays a central role in traditional contracts, smart 
contracts minimize trust requirements because they are defined and executed by the code (Swan, 
2015). Smart contracts do not change the expected outcome, they only lessen the role of human 
judgment (Swan, 2015). Steve Omohundro, president of think tank Self-Aware Systems, said: 
"That intersection of legal descriptions and software is fundamental, and the smart contracts are 
the first step in that direction" (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Smart contracts will potentially 
attenuate court litigations (de Meijer, 2015) and enable frictionless transactions. 
Since the launch of Ethereum in 2015, smart contracts enjoyed increased cognizance. 
Ethereum actualizes the possibilities of smart contracts by furnishing an open source platform 
(Ethereum, n.d.) that is foundational to its mission (Mougayar, 2016). Smart contracts stimulate 
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autonomous economic agents and decentralized autonomous organizations where code displaces 
human management and traditional corporations (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016) because coupled 
with the underlying blockchain platform, smart contracts enable innovative business models and 
settle the trust conundrum more profoundly (Zhao et al., 2016). As such, “smart contract also 
provides a means for owners of assets to pool their resources and create a corporation on the 
blockchain, where the articles of incorporation are coded into the contract, clearly spelling out 
and enforcing the rights of those owners” owners” (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). 
For example, a smart contract-based mortgage could reset automatically upon checking a 
prespecified agreement-encoded website (Swan, 2015) or could enable renting hotel rooms 
without human intervention (Zhao et al., 2016). Other simple examples listed by (Swan, 2015) 
are a smart contract that enacts a gift upon a grandchild’s eighteenth birthday, or a pre-
established smart contract that automatically transfers the ownership of a car title to individual 
owner upon completion of payments. A final smart contract example is envisioned by Toyota 
Research Institute where vehicle's sensors could store driving data on a blockchain, hence, 
allowing owners to be eligible for lower insurance rates by virtue of increased transparency, 
reduce fraud, and access to driving data that measures safety habits (Coindesk, 2017d). 
To interconnect smart contracts on the blockchain to off-chain databases, smart oracles 
are required. Smart oracles hold real-world information, such as an identity, a certificate, or any 
data element and could behave in an agent-like fashion to direct the smart contracts (Mougayar, 
2016). Therefore, one could envisage a world of interconnections and interactions between smart 
contracts, smart oracles, Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence that would open a wide 
range of possibilities. 
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Appendix B.5: Programable Money 
As a continuation of the earlier chapter ‘General applications’, this section will discuss 
programable money as the sixth and final chapter touch-point of blockchain technology 
according to the framework of Mougayar (2016). Although Bitcoin will be the focus of the 
discussion, the argument applies to any brand of cryptocurrency. Bitcoin is chosen because it is 
the first and the one with largest share in the cryptocurrency market, where numerous brands of 
cryptocurrency have emerged. One example is Litecoin—a platform similar to Bitcoin but faster 
(Kiviat, 2015). 
Money is defined as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account 
(Greeley, 2013; Van Alstyne, 2014). Although Bitcoins have no physical existence, no 
government sponsorship, and operate with mostly technical regulation, Bitcoin has all the of the 
three above mentioned attributes of money (Van Alstyne, 2014). Alternatively, according to 
Bjerg (2016) money could be conceptualized through any of three major theories: commodity 
theory, fiat theory, and credit theory; and “it is arguable that Bitcoin is commodity money 
without gold, fiat money without a state, and credit money without debt.” To the question of 
whether Bitcoin has value, Van Alstyne (2014) answers affirmatively that it already has. He 
further posits that, in the future, countries will establish their own cryptocurrency. Bitcoin 
adoption has increased rapidly, and today Bitcoin is honored as a unit of payment for various 
goods and services (Bjerg, 2016). 
As explained earlier, new Bitcoins are produced by ‘miners’ as a reward for their 
computational participation in the bitcoin network. The cryptocurrency is then circulated in the 
blockchain user’s network and is thereafter exchanged with goods, services or traditional fiat 
currencies. Van Alstyne (2014) argues for Bitcoin over conventional exchange methods stating 
that a) the Bitcoin network furnishes a near frictionless commerce platform that enables less 
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expensive transactions (Andreessen, 2014), b) transcends credit cards at detecting fraud since 
Bitcoin transactions require public authentication, and c) the Bitcoin protocol guarantees that 
only authorized parties can spend from a specific account with a guaranteed desired level of 
privacy and pseudonymity. Nonetheless, the pseudonymity feature led some critics to raise 
concerns related to the misuse of cryptocurrency for unlawful activities (de Meijer, 2015; Van 
Alstyne, 2014). However, conventional payment methods are hardly any different in that respect. 
To the contrary, Van Alstyne (2014) argues that the preferred method of exchange for criminals 
is cash. Moreover, he avers that the immutability and traceability of the blockchain ledger make 
it possible for legal authorities to identify and track lawless activities. 
Bitcoin presents a conceptual departure from conventional forms of money (Bjerg, 2016) 
and, therefore, is a fundamental change to some foundational basics in the financial industry. 
Consequently, it could existentially threaten traditional financial institutions because it radically 
alters the way transactions are conducted. Subsequently, the financial industry must explore how 
to benefit from cryptocurrency while adjusting for consequences that may not be advantageous. 
Consequently, de Meijer (2015) avers that financial institutions may benefit from collaborating 
with the ecosystem around crypto technology. Furthermore, a) cryptocurrencies are increasingly 
adopted by users, b) more salespoints are accepting cryptocurrency as a method for exchange, 
and c) the market cap of cryptocurrencies continues to increase—The reader may refer to 
Appendix E to appreciate the growth of market cap of cryptocurrency. Therefore, the financial 
industry cannot ignore the cryptocurrency growing phenomenon. 
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Appendix C: Actual blockchain structure 
Actual blockchain structure  (Narayanan et al., 2016) 
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Appendix D: Classes of Blockchain technology Non-Cryptocurrency Applications 
 
Blockchain Technology Applications Beyond Cryptocurrency (Swan, 2015) 
 
 
  
 121 
Appendix E: Market Cap of Top 10 Cryptocurrencies 
 
Market Cap of Top 10 Cryptocurrencies (cryptocurrencychart, n.d.). 
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Appendix F: Major Research Paradigms 
Positivist, Interpretive, & Critical Paradigms (Myers, 2013) 
Positivism Interpretivism Critical Systems 
The dominant form of 
research in most business 
and management disciplines 
Not as common but has 
gained ground over the past 
two decades 
Much less common. 
However, there are signs of 
growth 
Reality is objectively given 
and can be described by 
measurable properties, which 
are independent of the 
observer and their 
instruments 
Access to reality is only 
through social constructions 
such as language, 
consciousness, shared 
meanings, and instruments. 
The observer is part of the 
reality constructed 
Social reality is historically 
constituted and is produced 
and reproduced by people. 
Although people can 
consciously act to change 
their reality, they are 
constrained by forms of 
social, cultural, and political 
domination. 
Aligns with the tools of the 
natural science. 
The tools of the natural 
sciences are inappropriate for 
the study of social and 
organizational phenomena 
Similar to interpretive 
The language of science can 
be exact. Meanings are 
separate from facts. 
Human science Languages is 
irreducibly equivocal and 
evolving. Meanings are the 
facts. 
Similar to interpretive 
Attempts to increase the 
predictive understanding of 
phenomena 
Attempts to understand 
phenomena through the 
meanings that people assign 
to them 
Challenges prevailing 
beliefs, values, and 
assumptions that might be 
taken for granted by the 
subjects. 
Empirical data are assumed 
to be objective 
The correct meaning of data 
is determined by the context 
Different interpretations are 
given different weight or 
preference—sometimes 
imposed by some upon 
others. 
Assumes value-free data and 
facts 
Tries to be value-free, 
though acknowledging the 
Explicit ethical basis that 
motivates the researcher 
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difficulty work 
Propositions in terms of 
independent, dependent 
variables, and relationships 
Focus instead on the 
complexity of human sense 
making as the situation 
emerges 
Similar to Interpretive 
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Appendix G: Recruitment E-mail 
The following email was sent to each prospective participant in the study: 
Request to Participate in a Georgia State University Research Regarding the Impact of 
Blockchain Subject: Technology on the Financial Industry 
Email Text: 
Dear <Name of candidate participant>, 
 
As a subject matter expert on blockchain technology, you are cordially invited to 
participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of 
blockchain technology on the financial sector. 
 
Please feel free to read exact details in the ‘informed consent form’ attached. If you agree 
to participate, we will contact you to arrange for a time slot convenient to you. 
 
Participation in the research is voluntary and consists of a single interview over the 
phone, lasting no more than 1 hour. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. 
 
Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when the researchers 
present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in a 
synthesized form. You will not be identified personally. Nor will your organization be identified. 
 
Summary:  
Name and contact information of the interviewer: Al Tilooby at 510-770-4599 or 
aali38@student.gsu.edu 
Where the research will be conducted: Over the phone from Georgia State University 
Purpose of research: To investigate the impact of blockchain technology on the 
financial sector 
A summary of the criteria that will be used to determine eligibility: Financial 
industry blockchain technology executives, senior blockchain technology subject matter experts, 
and blockchain technology researchers. 
A brief list of participation benefits: There are no direct benefits to you personally. 
Overall, the research team hope to contribute the following to the existing body of knowledge: 
• Contribution to practitioners: How financial institutions can prepare for blockchain 
technology opportunities and threats. 
• Contribution to the literature: A synthesis of the extant financial literature related to 
blockchain technology, coupled with empirical accounts of industry perception of the 
future impact of blockchain technology. 
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• Contribution to the theory: A theoretical interpretation of blockchain technology as a 
disruptive technology in terms of transaction cost theory. 
 
The number of participants to be enrolled: 16 participants. 
Time or other commitment required: 1-hour interview conducted in a single session. 
Compensation, if any: You will not receive compensation for participating in this 
research. 
 
 
Thank you and Best Regards,  
 
Name: Al Tilooby 
Candidate – Doctorate in Business 
J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
Georgia State University 
35 Broad Street, NW, Suite 427 
Atlanta GA 30303 
e-mail: aali38@student.gsu.edu 
phone: +1-510-770-4599 
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Appendix H: Informed Consent From 
The following form was sent to and discussed with and accepted by all participants before the 
interviews. 
Georgia State University 
Department of Computer Information Systems 
 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Title: The impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions 
Investigators: Lars Mathiassen and Al Tilooby 
 
I.Purpose: 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to investigate the 
impact of blockchain technology on financial transactions with focus on asset verification, 
record keeping, data privacy, and transaction costs. You are invited to participate because you 
are a subject matter expert. Sixteen participants will participate in this study. Each participant 
will individually be interviewed over the phone for a maximum of one hour at a time slot of their 
convenience. 
 
II.Procedures:  
If you decide to participate, one of the investigators will contact you to arrange for a time slot 
convenient to you, then call you at the time to conduct and record the interview. The audio 
recordings will be captured on the investigator’s smart phone that is password-protected. The 
recording will be destroyed after the completion of the transcriptions to protect the 
confidentiality of the data. Only one investigator will conduct your interview. 
 
III.Risks:  
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life.  
 
IV.Benefits:  
Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope that the society will 
benefit from the contributions of this study to the existing body of knowledge as follows: 
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a) Contribution to practitioners: How the financial organizations can prepare for 
blockchain technology opportunities and threats. 
b) Contribution to the literature: A synthesis of the extant financial literature related 
to blockchain technology, coupled with empirical accounts of industry perception of the 
future impact of blockchain. 
c) Contribution to the theory: A theoretical interpretation of blockchain as a disruptive 
technology in terms of transaction cost theory. 
 
V.Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:  
Participation in research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in 
the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip 
questions or stop participating at any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits 
to which you are otherwise entitled to. 
 
VI.Confidentiality:  
The investigators will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Dr. Lars 
Mathiassen, and Al Tilooby will have access to the information you provide. Information may 
also be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly—GSU Institutional Review 
Board, the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP). The investigators will use your 
initials instead of your name on the study records. The information you provide will be stored on 
a password-protected smartphone for audio, and password-protected computer for taking notes 
and transcribing. The audio recording will be stored for no more than two weeks and then 
destroyed after the completion of the transcriptions to protect the confidentiality of the data. 
Your name and other facts that might point to you or the institution you work for will not appear 
when the researchers present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized 
and reported in a synthesized form. You will not be identified personally. Nor will your 
organization be identified. 
 
VII.Contact Persons:  
Contact Lars Mathiassen at 404-413-7855 or lars.mathiassen@ceprin.org; or Al Tilooby at 510-
770-4599 or aali38@student.gsu.edu if you have questions, concerns, or complaints about this 
study. You can also call if you think you have been harmed by the study. Call Susan Vogtner in 
the Georgia State University Office of Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or 
svogtner1@gsu.edu if you want to talk to someone who is not part of the study team. You can 
talk about questions, concerns, offer input, obtain information, or suggestions about the study. 
You can also call Susan Vogtner if you have questions or concerns about your rights in this 
study. 
 
VIII.Copy of Consent Form to Participant:  
Please save a copy of this consent form for your records. 
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If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be audio recorded, please continue with the 
interview. 
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Appendix I: Interview Protocol 
The following semi-structured interview protocol was conducted with each of the study 
participants: 
Interview Metadata 
 
Introductory script: 
Hi <participant’s name>. Thanks for accepting to participate in this study. My name is 
Al Tilooby. I am a candidate for a doctoral degree in business at Georgia State University. 
Please let me know if you have questions about the informed consent form, or other general 
questions.  
 
Thank you <participant’s name>. If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be 
audio recorded, please continue with the interview. And With your permission, I am going to 
start the recording and take notes as well. 
Just to make sure I ask the right questions, please tell me a bit about you and your 
background. 
Thank you <participant’s name>. The purpose of our interview today is to gather your 
perspective as input to our research study. The study is to understand the impact of blockchain 
technology on financial transactions with emphasis on asset verification, record keeping, data 
Date  
Initials of the interviewee  
Category of the interviewee: 
1. Financial industry executive 
2. Senior blockchain technology subject matter 
experts 
3. Blockchain technology researcher 
 
Length of Interview  
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privacy, and transaction costs. You have been selected to participate in this study because you 
are a subject matter expert.  
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
Opportunities Challenges & Issues Regulatory 
How could blockchain 
technology enhance asset 
verification in financial 
transactions? 
What are some of the 
challenges and issues the 
financial industry could face 
with blockchain technology 
regarding asset verification 
in financial transactions? 
Any regulatory aspects to 
watch out for in relation to 
blockchain technology and 
asset verification in 
financial transactions? 
 
  
How could blockchain 
technology enhance record 
keeping in financial 
transactions? 
What are some of the 
challenges and issues the 
financial industry could face 
with blockchain technology 
regarding record keeping in 
financial transactions? 
Any regulatory aspects to 
watch out for in relation to 
blockchain technology and 
record keeping in financial 
transactions? 
   
How could blockchain 
technology strengthen data 
privacy in financial 
transactions? 
What are some of the 
challenges and issues the 
financial industry could face 
with blockchain technology 
related to data privacy 
protection in financial 
transactions? 
Any regulatory aspects to 
watch out for in relation to 
blockchain technology and 
data privacy in financial 
transactions? 
   
Could blockchain 
technology decrease 
financial transaction costs? 
What are some of the 
challenges and issues the 
financial industry could face 
with transaction costs in 
relation to blockchain 
technology? 
Any regulatory aspects to 
watch out for in relation to 
blockchain technology and 
transaction costs in financial 
transactions? 
   
Any use cases for 
blockchain technology you 
could think of in financial 
transactions with regards to 
Challenges and issues that 
arise from these use cases? 
Regulatory impacts due to 
these use cases? 
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asset verification, record 
keeping, data privacy, or 
transaction costs. 
   
What is the likelihood that 
the financial industry will 
implement blockchain 
technology with regards to 
asset verification, record 
keeping, data privacy, or 
transaction costs. 
Roadblocks? Regulatory concerns 
   
Any further concluding 
insights and thoughts? 
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